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ABSTRACT
A risk assessment was conducted to estimate the potential economic
losses through 1993 due to the electrical effects of carbon fibers
released from U.S. general aviation aircraft. The usage of carbon fiber
(CF) composites in aircraft structures is expected to increase substan-
tially by 1993. Aircraft accidents often involve fires or explosions
that could conceivably release minute carbon fibers, which might disperse
in the atmosphere, penetrate buildings or enclosures, and cause damaging
shorts to electronic eauipment. Of an estimated 354 annual general
aviation aircraft accidents with fire in the U.S. in 1993, approx!imately
88 could involve aircraft using carbon fibers. These accidents could
result in the release of up to I.I kg. per accident, based on forecasts
of CF usage through 1993 and experimental tests with burning CF composites.
A methodology was developed to compute estimated dollar losses by
county and equipment type, using a Poisson model for the incidence of
equipment failures. This approach incorporated data on the geographic
distribution of potentially vulnerable facilities, as well as the mean
CF exposure levels at which various equipment would fail. The results
were then statistically aggregated to produce a national risk profile
for estimated annual losses in 1993. The expected national loss was
$253 per year (1977 dollars), and the likelihood of exceeding $107,000
in annual losses was estimated to be at most one in tenthousand. The
sensitivity of these results to major input parameters was investigated,
and it was found that under major parameter changes the expected losses
would still remain low.
I. INTRODUCTION
I.I BACKGROUNDANDOBJECTIVES
Carbon fiber (CF) composites are being considered as an alternative
material in the manufacture of private aircraft because of their light
weight, high strength, and design flexibility. As their production costs
decrease, CF composites are expected to find a considerable market in
aircraft, aerospace, automotive, and industrial applications. However,
in spite of the benefits of CF composites, a potential problem has been
identified associated with the high conductivity of the carbon fibers.
When composite structures are exposed to fire of sufficient duration and
intensity, it is possible that the epoxy binding material will burn off,
releasing individual fibers into the atmosphere. These fibers, if
deposited on electronic equipment, could cause shorts in low-voltage
circuits, resulting in damage to the equipment and possible economic
losses for the facility or community involved. The National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA) has been charged with the task of inves-
tigating the risk to the United States as a whole from potential releases
of CF in accidental aircraft fires. As a part of the program of risk
assessment, Arthur D. Little, Inc., was contracted to quantify the risks
associated with CF composite use in general aviation aircraft through
the year 1993.
In order to perform the risk assessment, information was gleaned
from several other agencies that are conducting parallel investigations,
with NASAas the coordinating agency. The data incorporated into the
analysis included fiber release characteristics for burning composites,
vulnerability test results for various categories of equipment, and
filter penetration experiments which are concerned with the ability of
single fibers to enter buildings. However, uncertainties remain in
data inputs for certain crucial elements of the risk analysis, which
can introduce substantial uncertainty into the magnitude of the resulting
risk estimates. Amongthe areas of greatest uncertainty are the fre-
quency of fire incidents, the quantities of CF that are actually released,
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and the equipment-disabling properties of fibers. In this report we
have attempted to show uncertainties explicitly, to make conservative
" assumptions where necessary, and to determine the sensitivity of our
risk estimates to these uncertainties and assumptions.
The objective of the present study was to assess the 1993 national
risk ofeconomic losses due to the utilization of carbon fiber composites
in general aviation aircraft. In formulating this objective, we identi-
fied as sub-objectives the projection of potential usage of carbon fiber
composites in U.S. general aviation aircraft through 1993, the develop-
ment of an accident model for general aviation aircraft, the analysis of
of the possible release amounts in general aviation accidents, the iden-
tification of demographic and industrial categories which might be exposed
to such releases, and the assessment of the economic consequences of a
given release. The demographic and economic analysis methods are modified
versions of the approach used in a parallel study I, in which we performed
a similar risk analysis for commercial air carriers_ using Monte Carlo
simulation techniques to generate a national risk profile. In the course
oF the present study, a simplified methodology was developed for generating
the national risk profile by direct computation. This is described in the
next section.
1.2 METHODOLOGY
Risk assessment of carbon fiber releases resulting from general
aviation accidents is different from previous risk assessment work
regarding accidental CF releases from commercial aircraft in several
ways. First, there are substantially more general aviation accidents
per year than commercial aircraft accidents. This difference
allows the utilization of analytic techniques based upon the statistics
of large numbers. A second difference is that general aviation accidents
are likely to occur in flight or near any of a large number of small
airports, while commercial aircraft accidents generally occur near major
metropolitan areas. Finally, the most significant difference lies in
the fact that general aviation fire accidents result in relatively small
releases of carbon fiber (compared to possible releases in commercial
aviation),and as a result the failure probabilities for equipment located
near an accident are generally smaller than for commercial aviation.
Because of these differences an analytic model was used for the
general aviation risk assessment instead of the Monte Carlo simulation
procedure used for the commercial aviation analysis. The analytic model
emphasizes the variation due to the random nature of failure events,
rather than that due to physical conditions such as accident location
and weather variations. Such_ model is appropriate when the number of
failures per release is low. In Appendix A it is shown that since each
individual fiber or group of fibers has a small but finite probability
of causing a failure, and since experiments have indicated that equipment
failures obey an exponential probability law, then the details of the
release conditions, with the exception of the total amount of fibers
released, are relatively unimportant. As a result, given the amount
released, each accidental release incident can be characterized by a
Poisson probability distribution for the number of failures. This
distribution can be successfully applied to events for which there are
a large number of probabilistic trials with a low probability of occur-
rence in each trial.
A simulation approach to risk estimation would not be appropriate
for several reasons. Since the dominant contribution to determining the
number of failures is the probabilistic nature of the individual failures
(i.e., the Poisson variation), the simulation approach requires a very
large number of Monte Carlo trials in order to develop any confidence in
the results. In addition, since general aviation accidents can occur o
in widely dispersed locations, a simulation would require a data collec-
tion effort that would be prohibitively costly, o
The analytic methods that we have developed for the present applica-
tion analyze the Poisson failure process for various equipment categories
_ and utilize numerical calculations of probabilities to estimate risk.
The analysis of equipment and facilities is performed on the county level,
and the actual probability calculations are based on mixtures of Poisson
distributions that apply for each combination of county, amount released
and equipment category. Appendix A presents a detailed discussion of the
Poisson process approach and the implications of low probability failures.
There were twokey parameters within the analytic model which
affected the number of failures per accident. The first was the amount
of fibers released in an accident. By examining the different types of
general aviation aircraft and their accident statistics, a distribution
q
of amounts of carbon fibers potentially released in accidents was}devel -
oped. The second key parameter was the density of facilities near the
location of an accident. Thus, an important aspect of the accident
model was a quantitative description of the distribution of facility
densities. The 3,000 counties in the United States were chosen as a
basis for estimating facility density, and hence a methodology was
developed to apportion accidents to the various counties.
The overall approach consisted of the following steps, as illustrated
in Figure I-I:
e A distribution of possible CF release quantities was
developed, based upon projected CF usage and several
possible accident scenarios.
e For each accident scenario, the surface integral of
exposure was estimated. This integral depends only
on the quantity of fibers released and the fiber
setting velocity.
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FIGURE1-1 OVERVIEWOF METHODOLOGY
• The conditional probability of a random accidental
fire occurring in each specific county was estimated
as a function of local and itinerant genera! avia-
tion operations.
m For each county in the U.S. the numbers of facilities
in various industrial categories, as well as prlvate
residences and community services, were enumerated.
Potentially vulnerable equipment was identified within
each facility category.
• The expected number of failures for each class of
equipment, county location, and release quantity were
calculated, using information about equipment vulner-
ability in terms of exposure.
m Assuming that the number of failures was Poisson-
distributed, a probability distribution was generated
for the number of failures per release incident,
aggregated over all counties and release scenarios.
• The proportion of failures occurring in each equipment
category was estimated and economic losses were assessed,
resulting in the statistics of dollar losses per release
incident.
• Finally, the statistics of annual dollar losses were
obtained using the estimated total number of fire incidents
per year. On the basis of these statistics, a national
risk profile was generated. The national risk profile is
a graphical display of the probability of exceeding various
levels of dollar loss as a result of the accidental release
of CF in a general aviation fire.
Chapters 2 to 4 of this report present the various input data
required for the risk analysis, and Chapter 5 describes the execution
of the above methodology.
1.3 RISK ANALYSISPRINCIPLES
The concept of risk can be defined as the potential for realization
of unwanted negative consequences of an event or activity. In the case
of this study, the unwanted negative consequences are the potential
economic losses due to electronic equipment failure. The event or
activity in question is the operation of general aviation aircraft
utilizing carbon fiber composites. If risk is due to the presence of
some causative agent, such as carbon fibers, then the degree of exposure*
is measured by the amount of that agent which is potentially active.
In the past decade, an increasing amount of attention has been
paid to problem areas involving activities with uncertain outcomes which
might engender large risks. In order to deal with these problems the
field of risk management has been created and developed. Risk management
is a methodical scientific approach towards dealing with such risks. The
quantitative aspects of risk management are often referred to as risk
analysis. Examples of the application of this approach are in the areas
of nuclear reactor safety and transportation of hazardous chemicals, such
as liquefied natural gases.
The practice of risk management involves three basic steps: risk
identification, risk measurement, and risk control. Potential risks can
be identified through experience, judgment, or experimentation. In the
case of the carbon fiber problem the nature of the risk is fairly well
understood. The major challenge lies in risk measurement, that is, in
determining the frequency of occurrence of events. Thus, the purpose
of risk analysis is to create an analytic framework permitting measure-
In this case, exposure is the time integral of concentration, with units
of fiber-seconds per cubic meter.
ment of exposure and risk. Finally, if the measured risk is considered
sufficiently great, control measures may be deemed necessary. Control
measures would consist of any modifications to the mechanism of risk
resulting in a reduction in the measured risk.
r,
There are various possible representations which can be used to
quantify risk. One possible representation is the expected value of
losses over a given period of time. However, in order to deal with
risks which may fluctuate over a wide range of losses and a corre-
spondingly wide range of frequencies of occurrence, a preferred method
of presentation is the risk profile. As discussed earlier, a risk
profile is a graphical display of risk showing the probability distri-
bution for exceeding various levels of unwanted impacts. A hypothetical
example of a risk profile is shown in Figure I-2. The activity in
question is labeled Activity 1 and the risk profile for Activity 1
shows that economic impact can vary from $I00,000 to $I0 million with
probabilities ranging from one in a thousand to one in ten thousand.
This risk profile may be compared against other profiles for different
types of events, such as the damage from tornadoes. In the diagram,
two comparator risk profiles are shown. If risk control options are
exercised, it may be possible to reduce the risk from Activity 1 as
shown by the dotted curve at the bottom. The vertical lines are
confidence bounds which show the uncertainty in the estimates of risk.
Even though the actual risk may fall anywhere between these confidence
bounds, the risk profile can still be used as an effective decision-
making tool since it both quantifies in an absolute sense the risks
imposed by Activity 1 and permits a comparison of these risks relative
to other known risks.
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2. CARBONFIBER USAGEFORECASTS
° 2.1 INTRODUCTION
Although carbon fiber (CF) composite materials are not presently
being used in quantity in general aviation aircraft, there is consider-
able interest in the potential utilization of these materials for light-
weight, high strength components. I The rate at which carbon fibers
will be introduced in the general aviation industry is difficult to
project due to the uncertainty of prices and design trends. There will
generally be modest amounts of carbon fiber composites used on general
aviation aircraft, particularly single reciprocating engine aircraft.
Eventually there may be large amounts of carbon fiber composites on a
few private aircraft. Lear Avia, for example, expects to be ultimately
producing in small quantities a jet aircraft with almost 1,000 pounds
of carbon fiber composites, although this projection did not directly
affect our analysis.
In this section we present an overview of the projected usage of
carbon fiber composites in general aviation, and then estimate the
amount of CF in the 1993 fleet. These projections are based mainly on
discussions between Arthur D. Little, Inc., aircraft manufacturers, and
NASA, and represent only an approximate forecast.
2.2 OVERVIEWOF COMPOSITEUSAGE
The general aviation and business aircraft industry, which includes
both fixed wing and rotary aircraft, continues to represent a very small
portion of fiber consumption within the aerospace industry. In 1978
o this sector consumed no more than 3,000 kg. of carbon fibers which repre-
sented less than 4% of total aerospace usage. The major portion of this
volume, probably as much as 65% to 70%, was used by rotary aircraft
ILarson, G.C., Composite Materials and General Aviation, Business and
Commercial Aviation (September, 1979).
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manufacturers, with the remainder split amongeight North American fixed
wing aircraft producers.
The rotary aircraft (helicopter) industry is made up of the follow-
ing five companies: Sikorsky, Bell-Helicopter Textron, Boeing-Vertol,
Hughes, and Kaman. The major output of these companies, currently esti-
mated at 65% to 70%, goes into military service. The remainder is sold
to various other customers in the commercial and general aviation market
All five companies are currently using carbon fiber to varying degrees,
both in research, development, and evaluation programs sponsored
by NASAor other government groups, and in selected operational appli-
cations.
The helicopter producers have generally made only limited inroads
in the use of CF epoxy composites relative to the commercial and
military fixed wing aircraft sectors, and in most cases on a retrofit
basis. The primary reasons for this have been the limited number of
units produced over which the development and production costs can be
spread, and the general acceptability of considerably less expensive
materials in most applications. It appears the contamination issue
has not been a deterring factor in the use of CF. The primary appli-
cation for CF has been as a stiffening agent in such areas as tail rotor
spars, spar blades, main rotors, fairings, and horizontal stabilizers.
In most cases where composite materials are utilized, fiber glass and/or
Kevlar constitute the major portion of the fiber requirement with CF
used in limited quantities for local stiffening. Normal ratios for
glass and/or Kevlar versus graphite range between 5:1 to I0:I.
On a weight basis, total carbon fiber consumption within the heli-
copter industry in 1978 approached 7,000 kg. Only 2,000 of these kg.
were believed to be used in areas other than military and commercial
applications, with the military sector accounting for the lion's share.
On a company-by-company basis, Sikorsky represented the largest consumer,
utilizing about 4,000 of the total 7,000 kg. The vast majority of this
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material, however, went into military aircraft with the S-76 "Spirit"
being the sole general aviation aircraft to utilize CF. The next
largest consumers were Boeing-Vertol and Kaman, each utilizing about
800 kg. of fiber. Here again the major portion went _oward military
applications. The remaining industry usage was split between Bell, Hughes
and various subcontractors for the industry, such as Fiber Science.
The predominant application for CF to date has been in rotor and
spar blades for the retrofit market. Uni-directional tape has been the
predominant material form used. Somewoven material is going into spar
booms, but other than this, woven product usage is minimal. Current
evaluation programs are under way at the various manufacturers for com-
ponents such as rotor hubs, transmission shafts, gearbox struts, landing
gear struts and various housings. It appears likely that uni-directional
tape will be the predominant material used for these applications as well;
however, woven material is expected to be used to at least some degree.
In terms of forecast carbon fiber consumption in non-military heli-
copter applications, we estimate usage will experience a steady climb up
to a level of 12,000 to 15,000 kg. by 1985, which represents at least a
six-fold increase over current levels. Probably as much as 30% of this
usage will go into research and development and new component evaluation
programs, with the remainder heavily weighted toward current applications.
Uni-directional tape will continue to comprise the lion's share of the
product form, with woven material gaining only slightly in popularity.
It is difficult to predict usage levels after this period since any
number of applications currently under evaluation might be specified
during this period, any of which could greatly affect the total consump-
tion levels. We feel, however, that fiber glass and Kevlar will continue
to represent the major portion of composite material consumed and CF will
continue to be used only in local stiffening applications in conjunction
with the above materials.
With respect to the business and general aviation fixed wing air-
craft industry, the primary manufacturers include Lear Avia, Beech, Gates
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Learjet, Cessna, Grumman, Pipe_and Rockwell International (all of the
United States) and Canadair and deHavilland of Canada. Only a few
of the above companies, namely Lear Avia, Beech, Cessna and Gates Learjet,
are currently using carbon fiber, predominantly in evaluation programs.
In addition to these aircraft manufacturers, there are a number of other
small companies using limited amounts of carbon fiber in components made
for both domestic and foreign aircraft producers.
As was the case in the helicopter industry, the use of CF has been
considerably limited by low production volumes and the acceptability of
more conventional and considerably less expensive materials. CF has
usually only been specified as a local stiffening agent for components
produced predominantly from fiber glass at Kevlar, the two largest of
which are spoilers and flaps. Components produced entirely from fiber
glass and/or Kevlar include such products as wing tips, wing/fuselage
spars, radomes, engine cowlings, tail covers and various fairings.
The one major exception to the limited applicational usage for CF
is Lear Avia, where they have been developing an all composite aircraft.
This aircraft, labeled the Learfan, will be made entirely of carbon/epoxy
and other composite materials with the exclusion of the engine, windows,
and assorted other subcomponents. The total empty wei!ght of this seven
to eight passenger, turboprop aircraft will be 1,650 kg., 700 kg. of which
will be comprised of composite materials.
The Learfan will use both pure fiber laminates as well as hybridized
forms, including CF, glass and Kevlar. Possibly even boron will be used
as well as phenolics and polymides where higher temperatures and/or stresses
present a problem. Woven fabric is expected to comprise the majority of
the material, although liberal amounts of uni-directional and multi-direc-
tional tape will also be employed.
This design is a radical deviation from the conventional applications
of CF in strictly secondary structural components. Lear hopes to have this
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aircraft test flown within one year and will then go into full production
shortly afterwards, expecting to attain a production rate of 250 to 300
per year by 1983. While there is still a great deal of market speculation
about its flight capabilities, potential CF contamination issues, and
selling price (supposedly the Learfan will be priced at about $1.2 million),
Lear states it already has orders for over II0 aircraft. The conductive
filament problem has not been resolved to date and this might affect FAA
certification. Because of the uncertainty concerning the Learfan and the
limited amount of total composite weight involved, compared to the 1993
forecast, we did not consider its impact in the analysis.
Of the remaining business and general aviation aircraft producers,
only Cessna and Beech appear to be using CF and only in extremely limited
amounts. Cessna, with almost 50%of the general aviation aircraf_ market,
is the only one of the two currently using CF in an operational applica-
tion. The material is used as a stiffening agent in the spoilers and
flaps of the new Citation III aircraft. Beech is still evaluating
various components and to date has elected not to specify CF.
The current consumption level of carbon fiber by Lear Avia and the
others was believed to be no higher than 1,000 kg. in 1978. Lear Avia
alone accounted for well over 700 kg. of this. While it is uncertain at
this time what kind of carbon fiber consumption levels will be attained
at Lear Avia, depending upon the success of failure of the Learfan, it
is highly unlikely that general consumption will increase very rapidly
over the nex_ five-year period. The primary reason for this pessimistic
forecast is the high cost premiums associated with CF and the questionable
need for such a high performance material in general aviation application.
Even with a growth rate similar to that in rotary aircraft applications,
carbon fiber usage within this sector: excluding Lear Avia, will be no
larger than 1,500 to 2,000 kg. by 1985, which is insignificant relative
to total consumption.
Lear Avia could greatly affect the consumption levels of this sec-
tor; however even with the most optimistic growth rates possible, total
usage would still be small relative to commercial and military usage.
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Lear Avia projects that by 1985 annual graphite fiber requirements could
be in excess of 30,000 kg.
The overall future of graphite fiber within the general aviation
sector therefore is not expected to be very promising. Current usage
is limited, and even with significant increases in applications, because
of the small production volume relative to the commercial and military
sectors, this area will continue to account for less than 5% of total
aerospace fiber consumption. We, nevertheless, have used conservatively
high projections of 1993 carbon fiber usage, as described in Section
2.4 below.
2.3 GROWTHRATESFORGENERALAVIATION AIRCRAFT
For the purposes of this study, we have classified general aviation
aircraft into three major categories:
I. Single reciprocating engine craft
2. Multi-engine and jet aircraft, and
3. Helicopters, non-fixed wing and non-powered aircraft
The identification of these three categories was based upon the accident
analysis presented in Chapter 3, and upon size and structural differences
between the different types of general aviation aircraft. Of the third
category, helicopters represent the overwhelming majority of aircraft.
The first two categories represent fixed wing powered aircraft. Of
these type of aircraft, the first category represents larger aircraft
and is expected to use larger amounts of carbon fiber composites in the
future.
Historical growth rates for the different classes of aircraft are
presented in Table 2-I. As noted, the growth rates for the three
classes of aircraft are 4.8%, 6.3%, and 8.6% per year respectively.
Since the three classes of aircraft are used to define accident
categories, the three growth rates were applied in Chapter 3 to estimate
the 1993 conditional probability that an accident involves an aircraft
16
TABLE 2-I
ACTIVE GENERALAVIATION AIRCRAFT
..... Fixed Wing Aircraft-
Year Multi -Encli ne Si ngl e-Engi ne Rotor
1976 25,684 144,941 6408
1975 24,559 136,651 5200 _
1974 23,418 131,932 4224
1973 21,929 126,217 4213
1972 19,849 120,446 4100
1971 17,855 109,256 3916
Growth Rate (%/yr) 6.3% 4.8% 8.6%
*active aircraft is defined as one which has a current registration
and was flown during the previous calendar year
Source: Aerospace Facts and Figures, 1978/79
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of a given type. These growth rates also imply that the number of air-
craft in use in 1993 will be 321_,000, 72,500 and 25,000, respectively.
2.4 PROJECTEDCF USAGEIN 1993
Any future projections of carbon fiber usage in general aviation
aircraft are subject to some uncertainty. However, based on discussions
with manufacturers it is anticipated that approximately 25% of the
general aviation fleet will be using carbon fibers by 1993. This pro-
jection is based on the large increases in fleet size between now and
1993. A significant number of the newly constructed planes will be
built with carbon fiber composites. Because of the uncertainty involved
in these projections, our risk profiles were subjected to sensitivity
analyses (see Chapter 6).
Based on these projections there will be 80,250 single reciprocating
engine craft, 18,125 multi-engine and jet aircraft, and 6,250 helicopter
and non-powered aircraft using carbon fibers in 1993. It is anticipated
that there will be not more than 1.3 million kilograms of carbon fiber
composites manufactured for use on general aviation aircraft by 1993.
Using this conservative forecast, and based on the belief that there will
be large amounts used on jet aircraft and still larger amounts on heli-
copters, we used the following projections for amount of composite per
aircraft carrying CF in 1993.
Single reciprocating engines 7 kilograms
Multi-engine and Jet Aircraft 20.5 kilograms
Helicopter, non-fixed wing
and non-powered 50.5 kilograms
These projections were used in Chapter 3 to determine the possible release
amounts in general aviation accidents.
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3. PROJECTIONOF ACCIDENTALCARBONFIBER RELEASES
3.1 INTRODUCTION
An important aspect of the risk assessment was a projection of the
frequency and type of general aviation accidents that would result in
accidental releases of carbon fibers. This involved an analysis of
general aviation accident histories from NTSBdata and characterization
of the conditions associated with potential CF releases. Due to the
complexity of the historical accident data, the analytical details are
presented in Appendix B. This chapter discusses only the highlights of
the analysis and presents the results that were subsequently used for
risk estimation.
r
3.2 GENERALAVIATION ACCIDENTCHARACTERISTICS
Three categories of general aviation aircraft were defined, as
mentioned in Chapter 2. It was determined that accidents for these
different aircraft types could be characterized to a sufficient extent
by two key variables - the phase of operation and the level of damage
sustained. Due to the Poisson methodology used in this risk assessment,
weather conditions and precise accident locations were not significant
in estimating the number of equipment failures per CF release incident.
The phase of operation was classified as either cruise or on or
near airport, the latter classification encompassing takeoffs, landings,
and static or taxi phases. The level of damage was classified as either
substantial damaqe or total destruction, in accordance with NTSBdesigna-
tions. The conditional probability of having a specific aircraft type,
phase, and damage level are shown in Table 3-I. These probabilities
represent the fraction of incidents in which each combination of charac-
teristics would occur. For example, given that an accident occurs,
there is a one-third chance that it will involve total destruction of
a single reciprocating engine craft during cruise. The figures in
Table 3-I are based on historical data and are adjusted to reflect the
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TABLE 3-I
CONDITIONALPROBABILITIESOF ACCIDENTCHARACTERISTICSIN 1993
.......... Cruise On or Near Airport---
Total Substantial Total Substantial
Destruction Damage Destruction Damage
Non-Fixed or .072 .013 .043 .014Non-Powered
Single Reciprocating .333 .023 .203 .034
Multiple or Jet .I01 .014 .122 .028
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growth rates for each aircraft type through 1993, which were presented
in Chapter 2.
To perform the national risk calculation, it wasnecessary to
estimate the total number of general aviation accidents in the U.S. in
1993, and to allocate these accidents to different counties according
to the degree of air traffic activity. The historical accident rate
appeared to be relatively constant, and hence was projected to remain
stable through 1993. Consequently, the annual number of general aviation
accidents, including commuter and air taxi operations, was estimated at
354. Of these about 25%, or 88 accidents, would involve CF according to
the usage projections in Chapter 2. These accidents were allocated to
various counties based on the estimated number of local and itinerant
operations in each county. The details of this procedure are presented
in Appendix B.
3.3 PROJECTIONOF AMOUNTRELEASED
Given that an accident occurs involving a general aviation aircraft
using carbon fiber composites and that a subsequent fire results, a po-
tential exists for release of carbon fibers. In order to estimate the
resulting damage, it is necessary to know the potential exposure to the
surrounding area due to carbon fibers. The phenomenon of carbon fiber
release and dispersion involves a complex chain of events, and to physi-
cally model these events would require a knowledge of the fire parameters
such as pool size, duration, and amount of fuel burned, as well as the
weather conditions at the time of accident. Since these parameters would
be difficult to specify in the case of randomly located general aviation
accidents, we have adopted a simplified methodology (as described quali-
tatively in Chapter 1 and in detail in Appendix A)which circumvents the
need for most information. The only information necessary is the total
amount of carbon fibers released in the fire, since the distribution
of the number of failed equipment becomes independent of the other release
conditions. This section presents the assumptions concerning the amount
of carbon fibers released in a general aviation fire accident, which
depends on two factors:
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t The amount of CF on the aircraft
i The severity of the fire and/or explosion
It was assumed that the amount released will be proportional to the
total amount of carbon fiber composites being used on the aircraft. As
noted in Chapter 2, there are three types of general aviation aircraft,
namely single reciprocating engine planes, multiple and jet engine planes,
and non-fixed wing and non-powered planes. The amounts of carbon fibers
being used on these craft are presented in Chapter 2. It is forecasted
that 25% of the 1993 fleet will be using carbon fibers and hence the
probability that an accident will result in a CF release is 25%.
The model for general aviation aircraft accidents described in
Section 3.2 defines severity in terms of the NTSB classification of
substantial damage and total destruction. These classifications were
used for the purposes of determining the percentage of fibers released
in an accident. Based on experimental findings reported in the analysis
of commercial aviation aircraft* it was estimated that not more than
I% of carbon fibers would be released in a fire and that not more than
2.5% would be released in most fire and explosion scenarios. In addition,
in commercial aviation accidents not all of the carbon fiber composites
would be consumed in a fire, while the explosive mode represents only a
small minority of commercial aviation accidents.
Based on these considerations, we conservatively assumed that the
carbon fiber released in a general aviation accident would be 2% and
0.5% of the total carbon fiber composite, respectively, for total
destruction and substantial damage accidents. Since the carbon fiber
mass comprises approximately 70% of the mass of the carbon fiber compo-
site, these assumptions represent 2.9 and 0.7% of the carbon fiber mass
respectively for total destruction and substantial damage accidents.
*See Reference I, Chapter 1
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From the assumptions in Chapter 2 about composite utilization in 1993,
we determined the total mass of carbon fibers released for each combina-
tion of accident severity and aircraft type. These data are presented
in Table 3-2. The maximumpossible release is 1.09 kilograms for the
case of a total destruction helicopter accident.
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TABLE 3-2
MASSOF CARBONFIBERS RELEASED(KG.) FORGENERAL
AVIATION ACCIDENTS 1993
Substantial Total
Damage Destruction
Accident Accident
Single Reciprocating .034 .14
Engine
Multiple or Jet Engine .I0 .41
Non-Fixed-Wing or
.27 1.09Non-Powered
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4. DEMOGRAPHICANALYSISOF VULNERABLEFACILITIES
4.7 INTRODUCTION
The national risk profile for economic losses resulting from acci-
dental carbon fiber releases from general aviation aircraft was based
on the distribution of facilities with vulnerable equipment. A set of
parameters was selected to describe each U.S. county for the purposes
of the risk analysis presented in Chapter 5. These parameters pertain
to demographic data which are readily available from published sources.
This chapter presents the basis for the demographic analysis, as well
as the economic analysis of the consequences of failures. Most of the
data utilized here were developed in a parallel study of air carrier
fires and CF releases. (See Reference I, Chapter 7).
4.2 METHODOLOGY
The first step in the analysis was to represent the facilities
considered to be potentially vulnerable by demographic classes such
as households or the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes for
businesses. For several other facility categories, indices were
required where actual data on facilities were not available; for
instance, population was used as a surrogate to measure the amount of
police and fire protection services. Table 4-I shows the facility
categories and the demographic data used to represent each facility
category. Table 4-2 shows the data sources for each of the demographic
data classifications. The assignment of facility categories studied in
the economic analysis to demographic data categories involved some
aggregation. For example, the general manufacturing category includes
equipment classes identified in specific manufacturing environments
which were taken as representative of the level of vulnerable equipment
in all manufacturing plants.
Given the data categories for facilities, the amount of activity
in terms of number of pieces of equipment in each county was determined
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TABLE 4-I
FACILITY ANDDEMOGRAPHICATEGORIES _'
FacilityType be_no_raphicData Category
Households Families
Police ProtectionServices Population
Fire ProtectionServices Population
Post Office Sorting Centers. Population
Subways Number of Rapid Transit Vehicles
Commuterand Intercity
Railroad RailroadTerminals
GeneralManufacturing SIC Code 19
Manufacturersof Electronic
Equipment SIC Codes 3573, 3650, 3660, 3670
TelephoneCompanySwitching
Facilities Families
Radio and Television
Broadcasting SIC Codes 4830, 4890
GeneralMerchandiseRetailers SIC Codes 5310, 5600, 5700, 5900
Retail Grocers SIC Code 5410
Financialand Insurance
Services SIC Codes 6020, 6100, 6200, 6300
Computer Services SIC Code 7370
ElectronicR&D Firms and
Universities SIC Codes 7391, 8220
Hospitals Number of Hospital Beds
Airport Services Number of Air Carrier Operations - 1977 "
Automobile and Truck
Assembly SIC Code 3710
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TABLE4-2
DEMOGRAPHICDATA SOURCES
DemographicData Category Data Source
SIC Data U.S. Census Bureau, 1976 County Business
Patterns
Families,Population, U.S. Census Bureau, 1977 County and City
Number of Hospital Beds Data Book
Number of Rapid Transit American Public Transit Association
Vehicles
Railroad Terminals The Official Railway Guide, North
American Passenger Travel Edition,
July/August 1979
Number of Air Carrier U.S. Departmentof Transportation,
Operations- 1977 FederalAviation Administration,
TerminalArea Forecasts,Fiscal Years
1979-1990
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from scaling factors. These scaling factors included such measures as the
average number of employees per SIC category. For each facility surveyed
in the economic analysis, the number of pieces of equipment and the value _,
of the scaling factor for that facility were determined. From the survey,
standard factors were developed, such as one piece of equipment class x for
every 1,000 employees in SIC category y. In this manner, the number of
pieces of equipment in each category of vulnerable equipment was determined
for each facility category. Appendices C and D contain listings of the
equipment categories, with the scaling factors used for each facility
type.
For every facility and equipment combination, the following parameters
were identified: the mean dosage for failure, the transfer functions for
outside to inside CF exposure, and the dollar cost per failure. FoUrcon-
venience in the risk computation, described in detail in Chapter 5, the mean
dosage for failt_re and the transfer functions were combined to develop the
effective mean outside dosage E for failure. When there was a range of
transfer functions depending on building characteristics, the arithmetic
mean of the high and low transfer functions was used; this procedure resulted
in a number of about the same order of magnitude as the high end of the
transfer function range, which is a consistently conservative assumption.
Equipment categories which had equivalent E values and equivalent demo-
graphic data categories were combined for efficiency in computer process-
ing. The dollar cost per failure of one piece of equipment was derived
as the weighted average of the unit costs for each equipment category.
Given the estimate of the number of pieces of equipment for each
facility category and equipment type, the computer procedure described
in Chapter 5 could be implemented, providing probabilities of equipment
failure for each category. The risk profile for dollar losses was
derived by combining these probabilities with the dollar loss per failure
of equipment. These losses were taken as the sum of the equipment repair
and facility disruption costs per failure of equipment. In theory, this
procedure could overestimate losses if the expected number of pieces of
equipment failing in a single facility were greater than one; in that
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case the facility disruption cost, which might not increase beyond the
first equipment failure, would be overestimated. However, with the CF
releases being very low relative to the E values, the expected number
of equipment failures in any facility would always be systematically lower
than one. AppendixC showsthe estimated dollar losses per equipment failure.
4.3 SUMMARYOF ECONOMICANALYSIS
Details of the economic loss analysis may be found in Reference I,
Chapter I. Someof the major observations that resulted were as follows:
• Most industrial and commercial facilities are equipped
for repair or replacement of electronic devices in the
event of failures during normal operation. !
m Equipment which are critical to the operation of a
facility, such as computers, are usually given special
protection, and backup procedures are often available
to prevent facility shut-down.
m Much of the electronic equipment examined is virtually
invulnerable to the expected levels of indoor. CF ex-
posure (at most I0 G fiber-seconds/m. 3) due to protective
cabinets and filtration systems.
Consequently, there are few instances in which a facility would
experience significant economic losses as a result of CF exposure. The
maximumdollar loss estimated for a single equipment failure was the
$65,800 attributed to the loss of a transformer substation switch. The
generally low failure costs are reflected in the low risk estimates
derived in Chapter 5.
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5. DEVELOPMENTOF NATIONALRISK PROFILE
5.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter describes the methodology used to determine the
national risk profile and presents an interpretation of the results.
The methodology utilized a computer model to calculate the probability
distribution for the consequences of a single accident. These single
accident results were then extrapolated to obtain a national estimate
of expected annual losses.
The remainder of the chapter is divided into four sections.
Section 5.2 presents the methodology and results for the potential
economic losses in a single automobile accident. The mathematical !
basis for the methodology in this section is presented in Appendices
A and E. In Section 5.3, the results for a single incident are
extrapolated to an annual risk profile. The extrapolation technique
uses the distribution of dollar losses in a single accident to derive
an annual dollar loss distribution based on an expected 88 accidents
per year involving CF composites. In Section 5.4, results of a sensi-
tivity analysis are presented. It is noted that the change in annual
dollar loss probabilities with respect to the changes in input parameters,
such as release amounts, can be represented by a very simple mathematical
relationship. Finally Section 5.5 contains a summary discussion of the
results.
Before examining the details of the methodology it is important
to understand the principle of the Poisson approach. For a given release
scenario and equipment type, the number of equipment failures may be
approximated by a Poisson distribution. The mean number of failures is
given by integrating the equipment density over the area in question and
multiplying by the equipment failure probability, which is nearly linear
in E for low values of the exposure E. Under modest assumptions, we can
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aggregate over many release scenarios, and show that the average number
of failures is proportional to the surface integral S of the exposure,
which in turn may be shownto depend only on the amount released and the
fiber settling velocity. Thus an expression is obtained for the mean
numberof failures per incident in terms of just the average facility
density, the amount of CF released, and the equipment vulnerability.
This enables us to assess the risk without requiring detailed data on
accident conditions or geographic locations.
Most of the technical details of the methodology are presented in
the appendices. There are, however, some fundamental mathematical
relationships that control the results developed in this report. These
relationships are presented below to emphasize their importance in the
final analysis. A glossary of symbols used in the relationships dis-
cussed in this chapter is presented in Table 5-I.
The first key relationship is between _, the expected number of
equipment failures in an accident, and such parameters as the amount of
carbon fibers released, the equipment vulnerability, and the density of
facilities. For any given county and equipment class, the expected number
of equipment failures per accident is proportional to the amount of
carbon fibers released and the density of facilities, and is inversely
proportional to the mean exposure to failure for the equipment. The
actual computation of _ is done by summing up contributions from each
county in the U.S. and from each equipment class. The mechanics of
these computations and the determination of the probability distribution
of the number of failures are presented in Appendix A.
The second set of relationships links the mean and standard devia-
tion of the dollar loss in a single accident to the parameters of the
distribution for the number of equipment failures in an accident. These
relationships are based on standard formulae for conditional expectation,
and they can be found, for example, in Parzen, E., Stochastic Processes,
p. 55. The equations imply that the expected value of L, the total dollar
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TABLE5-I
GLOSSARYOF SYMBOLS
E = Mean outside exposure to failure
No = Number of equipment failures in an accident
" :.... ' ' ' ..... " fr'om a_ "1_ ........ _ f_ii "_'i _ '_ _:" "
-'Dollar loss resultlng i e t "
xj = Expected number of equipments of type j that fail given
ll_(l) = PrObabliiiy lilt ,,i: ,..:_ ,:......_;,_."pieces of equipment f£_l <i'd''afi''' .............
[ = T.o,tal.,dollarIess ann_all.yfor,all accidents
M = Number,.of accidental fai:lures involving CFnationallly'
= Expe&ted Value of-N o
E : Expectati,on
n = DummyvBriable,to denote number.of events
x = Dummyvaiiabiifor dollarlos= ....
Mar = Variance . ,.-. , _ ..
(Xln.) = Vari_able,X:givendummy value n
Y = Dummyvariable for dollar ios_ per'a_dident
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loss in a single accident, is proportional to _, the expected numberof
equipment failures in an accident, and that the variance of L has two
terms, one which is proportional to _ and one which is proportional to
the variance of the numberof failures per accident.
The final set of important relationships links the statistics of
the total annual dollar loss for all accidents to the statistics of the
dollar loss in a single accident. These results are based on the same
type of conditional expectations relationships referred to above. The
expected value of the annual dollar loss is proportional to the number
of accidents per year and the expected value of the dollar loss per
accident. The variance of the dollar loss per year is approximately
proportional to the variance of the dollar loss per accident and the
expected number of accidents per year.
To convert the statistics of annual dollar loss into a distribution,
some standard statistical methods are used. The results obtained and the
outcome of a sensitivity analysis, are presented in the remainder of the
chapter.
5.2 COMPUTATIONOF LOSSESPER INCIDENT
The computation of the dollar losses per automobile accident is
performed in two separate steps. In the first step, a probability
distribution of the number of failures contingent upon a single accident
is calculated. In the second step, the statistics of the dollar losses
(rather than the number of failures) are computed.
An analytic methodology was developed to compute the distribution
of the number of failures contingent on a single fire accident. The
methodology is based upon the fact that for a given county and equipment
class, the number of failures is approximately Poisson distributed.
This is due to the extremely low probability of equipment failure at
the levels of exposure typically computed for automobile fires. Because
the dominant variation in economic losses is due to the Poisson failure
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process, this methodology does not require detailed modelling of release
conditions or accident locations. As shown in Appendix A, the expected
number of failures per accident is directly proportional to the geographic
density of equipment and the amount of fibers released and inversely
proportional to the equipment's mean failure level, E.
Implementation of the Poisson methodology required tabulation of
data for approximately 3,000 counties in the United States, 81 equipment
categories, and several possible release amounts. To handle these data,
a computer model was developed and used to determine the distribution of
failures contingent upon a single fire incident. Figure 5-I describes
the logical flow of the model and its extrapolation to the national
level. As explained in Appendix A, the model tabulates a mixture of a
large number of Poisson random variables. There is a separate random
variable for each combination of county, equipment category and amounts
released. The model adds up the probabilities of any number of failures
given each of these possible combinations and weighs them by the appro-
priate conditional probability of that scenario. The result is the
probability that, given an accident in some county, a given number of
failures will occur. This distribution is presented in Table 5-2.
The next step in the analysis was to develop the distribution of
dollar loss given an accident. The mean and variance of the dollar
losses per accident depend on the statistics of the number of failures
and of the dollar loss per failure. For example, if there were five
equipment failures, then the expected value of the dollar losses in the
accident would be five times the expected value of the dollar loss per
accident, and the variance would be five times the variance of the dollar
loss per accident.
Formally, we used the computer-generated values of _j, the expected
number of equipment of type j that failed given an accident. On an
aggregate basis, the _j's represent failure rates for the given equip-
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FIGURE5-I: RISK ANALYSIS PROCEDURE
TABLE 5-2
PROBABILITYDISTRIBUTIONOF NUMBER
OF FAILURESGIVEN AN ACCIDENT
Number of Failures Probability
0 .98
1 1.8 X 10-2
2 2 X 10-3
3 2 X 10TM
4 1 XIO -4
5 4X I0 -_
> 5 4XIO -_
Mean 0.022
Standard Deviaion 0.17
36
ment classes and the conditional probabilities that any given failure
is of type j. Thus
I.
3
Prob(Equipment Type j Fails]Some Equipment Fails) = _.
3
Using this probability function together with the economic loss estimate
described in Chapter 4, we developed a distribution of the dollar loss
per failure, Xo. We then used the following equations to find the mean
and variance of L, the total loss per accident.
EL = (EXo) (EN) (5-I)
Var L : (EN)Var Xo + (EXo)2 Var N
L
The expectation equation simply states that the expectation of total
dollar loss in an accident is equal to the number of failures times the
dollar loss per failure. There are two terms in the variance expression.
The first term represents the variability due to the dollar loss per
failure distribution, while the second term represents the variability
in the number of failures per accident. The variance equation is not
exact due to the correlation between the dollar loss per failure and
the number of failures. The precise form of the computations is presented
in Appendix E. Using those expressions, we derived estimates for the
dollar losses in an accident, as presented in Table 5-3.
Although our methodology does not permit us to determine the precise
distribution of dollar losses per accident, we developed upper bounds for
these probabilities based on a standard result from probability theory.
This result, which is known as the Chebyshev inequality, was used to
determine upper bounds for the probability distribution of dollar losses
per accident as well as upper bounds for the distribution of the dollar
losses annually. The Chebyshev inequality (see, for example, Feller,
Introduction to Probability Theory and Its Applications, Vol. II, p. 151)
states that:
Prob (L _ EL + to(L)) _ I/t 2
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TABLE5-3
STATISTICS OF ECONOMICONSEQUENCESFORA SINGLEACCIDENT(1993)
Variable Standard
Symbol Variable Name Expected Value Deviation
No Number of equipment 0.022 0.17failures per incident
Xo Dollar loss per $131 $754fa i I ure
L Total dollar loss $2.88 $114
per incident
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Thus, the probability that the risk is more than I0 standard deviations
above the mean is less than or equal to 10-2. Utilizing the Chebyshev
inequality, we developed Table 5-4*which presents upper bounds for risk
values.
5.3 DERIVATIONOF NATIONALLOSSSTATISTICS
The next step in the analysis was to compute the national risk pro-
file, which requires only a knowledge of the mean and variance of dollar
losses per accident. To derive the national risk profile, a two-step
procedure was employed. These steps consisted of:
e Computation of the mean and the variance of the national
risk profile, and
e Estimation of a probability distribution based on
statistical results.
To compute the mean and variance of the national risk profile, the follow-
ing conditional expectation equations were utilized:
E(L) = (EM) EL
Var(L) = (EM) Var L + (Var M) (EL) 2
where
L = Dollar loss per accident
[ = National dollar loss
M = Number of accidental fires with CF nationally
EM = Expected value of M
EL = Expected value of L
As noted in Chapter 3, there are 88 fire accidents annually involving
general aviation aircraft using carbon fibers. Assuming that the number
of accidents per year M is a Poisson random variable, then EM= 88, Var M =
88, and hence, EL = 253 and _ = $1,067. These statistics are summarized
in Table 5-5. We again derived an upper bound for this distribution based
*A second version of the inequality used only for the first entry in Table
5-4, states that Prob(L _ t EL) < I/t
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TABLE 5-4
UPPERBOUNDSFORTHE PROBABILITYDISTRIBUTIONOF
DOLLARLOSSPERACCIDENT(1993)
Upper Bound for Probability
that Loss Exceeds this Value
Dollar Loss Given that an Accident Occurs
$ 288 10-2
11,403 10-4
114,000 10-6
1,140,000 10-8
4O
TABLE5-5
STATISTICSOF ECONOMICCONSEQUENCESFORALL
ACCIDENTSNATIONALLY(1993)
Variable Expected Standard
Symbol Variable Name Value Deviation
L Total dollar loss $2.88 $114
per incident
M Numberof incidents 88 88
per year (Poisson
Distribution)
Total annual dollar $253 $1,067
loss
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on the Chebyshev inequality. These results are presented in Table 5-6.
The national risk profile is depicted graphically in Figure 5-2, incorp-
orating the Chebyshev bounds for losses in excess of $50,000.
5.4 SENSITIVITY ANALYSlS
We next examined the sensitivity of the national risk profile to
input assumptions. Someof these sensitivities could be hand calculated
without any additional computer runs. The reason for this is that the
number of failures per accident is a Poisson random variable. Hence the
expected value and variance for the number of failures are approximately
and from Equations (5-I), the expected loss per accident is:
E Xo
I
and the variance of loss per accident is approximately equal to
_(E X 2 + Var Xo)0
As an example of a sensitivity analysis using these equations,
suppose that the CF amounts released in an accident decrease by a factor
of I0. In this case the expected numbers of failures for the various
equipment classes would all decrease by a factor of I0, while the
conditional probability of dollar loss given a single failure would
remain the same. As a result we can make the following calculations
for the loss statistics. Note that the expected national loss has
decreased by a factor of I0, to $25.
= 0.0022
EL = 0.29
OL = 36
EL = 25.3
_ : 338
The Chebyshev inequality results are tabulated in Table 5-7.
Wealso examined the sensitivity for a highly conservative scenario
(Table 5-8) in which amounts released were increased by a factor of ten.
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TABLE 5-6
CHEBYSHEVBOUNDSFORNATIONALRISK PROFILE
Upper Bound for !
_Annual National Probability that Loss
Dollar Loss Exceeds Value
10,923 10-2
106,953 10-4
1,067,253 I0 -G
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TABLE 5-7
CHEBYSHEVUPPERBOUNDSFORSENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
J
WHERERELEASEAMOUNTSDECREASEBY A FACTOROF I0
Annual Dollar Upper Bound for Proability
Loss for Nation (1993) that Loss Exceeds Value
3,405 10-2
33,825 10-4
338,000 I0 -6
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TABLE 5-8
CHEBYSHEVUPPERBOUNDSFORHIGHLYCONSERVATIVESCENARIO
Annual Dollar Upper Bound for Probability
Loss for Nation (1993) that Loss Exceeds Value
106,953 I0 -s
1,067,253 I0 -s
10,670,253 10-7
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The same sensitivity analysis applies if the equipment E values decrease
by a factor of ten, Note that the loss probabilities increase by a factor
oflOeach for these cases. Thus, for example, the probability of exceed-
ing a million dollar annual loss increases from approximately I0 "G to 10-5
In general, if the amount released increases by a given factor or if
values decrease by the same factor, then the probabilities will increase
by that factor. In spite of the highly conservative assumption, the
changed values in Table 5-8 still represent low probabilities of substan-
tial losses.
5.5 SUMMARYOF RESULTS
The first step in the risk ana]ysis number was to project the number
of equipment failures, given that an accident occurred somewhere in the
U.S. and released some quantity of carbon fibers. The expected number
of failures per release incident was extremely small, resulting in an
expected dollar loss per incident of only $2.88, with a standard deviation
of $114. The probability of an accident resulting in losses exceeding
$11,400 was estimated to be at most one in ten thousand. Then based on
an estimated 88 general aviation fire accidents per year, which could
potentially release CF by 1993, it was found that the expected annual
loss to the nation as a whole was $253, with a standard deviation of
$1,067. The probability that the national loss will exceed $107,000 was
estimated to be at most one in ten thousand.
The sensitivity of these results to several input parameters was
explored. The key parameter affecting the national risk is the amount
of carbon fiber which could potentially be released in an accident.
For example, decreasing the CF release quantities by a factor of I0 was
found to decrease the national risk by about a factor of I0, to $25.
Conversely, increasing the CF released by a factor of I0 would increase
the expected national risk to about $2,530. The chances of the national
losses exceeding $1.07 mi,llion were estimated at one in one-hundred
thousand for this scenarilo. Hence, this highly conservative scenario
also results in:Iowprobabilities of substantial losses.
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6. CONCLUSIONS
6.1 NATIONALRISK
The results of the risk analysis indicate that the potential risks
of economic losses due to CF releases from general aviation accidents
are relatively small. The expected national risk was estimated to be
only about $253 per year for 1993, with the average loss per incident
being on the order of a few dollars. Furthermore, the chances of sub-
stantial losses are not significant. For example the probability of
exceeding $II,000 loss in one year was estimated to be about I/I00.
Although the possible consequences of a single accident can vary greatly,
depending upon whether equipment failures do occur, the likelihood of
such a failure is only 0.022 per incident.
It should be noted, however, that the risk estimates are subject to
uncertainty from a number of different sources. The assumptions or
uncertainties incorporated into the anlaysis are discussed below. Even
when sensitivity analyses were performed to test the effect of these
assumptions, the risks were found to be reasonably low. For example,
the likelihood of exceeding $I million due to CF releases from general
aviation accidents is only I0 -s even if the amounts released are
increased by a factor of I0.
6.2 SUMMARYOF UNCERTAINTIES
The uncertainties in the national risk estimate may be analyzed
by considering the different data inputs incorporated into the model.
The chief areas of uncertainty are the fraction of fibers released
and the vulnerability levels of electronic equipment. However, even the
most conservative scenarios in our sensitivity analyses indicate that
the overall national risk is low. Someof the major areas of uncertainty
are discussed below:
e Carbon fiber usage -- The projected usage could conceivably
vary by a factor of 2 or 3 in terms of CF weight per air-
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craft. However, such variations are taken into account
in the sensitivity analysis by varying the amount of CF
released given an accident.
• Number of fibers by weight -- The present report assumes
that there are 5 x 109 single fibers per kilogram of CF
available for release, based on previous NASAestimates.
Although this value is subject to uncertainty, 5 x 109
represents a conservative estimate.
m Fraction of CF released -- Recent NASAtest results
indicate that the 2.9% figure used in our base analysis
for total destruction accidents is extremely conservative,
and that it is possible that no more than 0.1% of single
fibers by weight would be released. In any case, the sensi-
tivity analysis in which the amount of CF released increases
by I0, covers the extreme case for this parameter.
e Accident probability -- The estimate of 340 accidents
per year is based on nine years of historical data. A
98% Poisson upper confidence bound would increase this
to only 377. Furthermore, although general aviation
activity is increasing, there is no statistical evidence
of an increase in the number of accidents occurring
annually.
,m Equipment vulnerability -- The estimated mean failure
levels could vary considerably, but this possibility
was addressed in the sensitivity analysis for the con-
servative scenario described in Chapter 5. The expected
annual losses in this case, also assuming a ten-fold
increase in CF release, were about $2500 for 1993.
i
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• Economic losses -. The estimates of.losses per equipment
failure are subject to variations between facilities and
regions, but this will contribute negligibly to the over- _
all uncertainty.
In summary, the sensi%iVity analysis indicates that there is very
little chance of substantial losses, with a "best estimate" expected
annual loss for 1993 of $250. This level of risk is quite small
compared to the direct property damage resulting annually from general
aviation accidents. However, it should be noted that the present
risk assessment has addressed only dollar losses due to equipment failure
in the civilian sector, and does not quantify other categories of risk
such as costs of protection or cleanup of equipment, CF releases from
non-aviation sources such as incineration of sporting goods, possible
environmental damage by carbon fibers, or impacts upon military
operations.
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APPENDIXA
,, METHODOLOGYAND SYSTEMOF EQUATIONSFORGENERALAVIATION RISK MODEL
A.I INTRODUCTION
This appendix presents the methodology and procedure for constructing
the risk profiles. The methodology applies the Poisson process to
release types and is based on actual calculations of probabilities
rather than a simulation. Section A.2 presents the rationale for the
methodology and Section A.3 the procedure.
A.2 BACKGROUND
There were several characteristics that distinguished the general avia-
tion analysis from the air carrier analysis also performed by Arthur D.
Little. First, the collection of detailed locational data on accident
scenarios (locations of accidents relative to locations of facilities)
was not feasible. Second, the expected number of failed pieces of
equipment per release was extremely small. Nearly all were substan-
tially less than one.
Given these differences, a different type of methodology was used, The
basis of the methodology is the computation of the expected number of
failures given a release for a particular equipment type. The equation
for this is:
E(dAir)
( E°(dA) )
r = I n(dA) 1 - e (I)
" No A '
A-I
where
r = Set of releaseconditions
Nor = Expectednumberof failuresfor givenrelease
dA = Incrementof surfacearea
A = Surface area
n(dA) = Density of equipment within area increment dA
E(dAlr) = Exposure within area increment dA given set of release conditions r
E (dA) = Mean exposure to failure for equipment in given area dA0
(incorporating transfer functions)
For general aviation accidents, the amounts are very small and E tends
{
to be a great deal smaller than Eo. For example, a typical exposure:,
contour for a general aviation release showed maximumexposures of 103
f.s/m 3, while most Eo values are at least 107.
In view of this (I) can be approximated using Taylor series as:
o (E(dAlr) ) (2)Nr =f n(dA) Eo(dA).A
Although n(dA) may not be uniform, we can compute the average value of
No (averaged over release conditions) for a given release amount of
carbon fibers by
-No : If(r) In(dA) E(dAlr) dr = n f(r) E(dAlr)dr
Eo(da ) Eo r A (3)r A
where
No = Expected number of failures averaged over all releases
r = Release conditions
A-2
-]-: = Reciprocal average exposure to failure of equipment in
Eo the county
f(r) = Probability function for release conditions
and
E(dalr)
Eo f f(r) f n (dA) _-_-/-a-_--dr
-- r A _0\_''j " (/4)n :
I f(r) f E(dAIr)dr
r A
In other words, h represents the average density of equipment where the
averaging is over locations weighted by exposure and vulnerability values for
the range of possible release conditions for a given amount released. Because of
the random locations of accidents and random directions of wind, YT;can
be approximated by D, the average density of equipment in the county.
If it could be demonstrated that the largest concentrations of fibers
generally occur at the locations of densest concentrations, then
would exceed D.
To investigate the possibility that n > D, we looked at average city
population densities weighted by population (i.e., the density of the
city of the average person) and average county population densities
weighted by population. Since the numbers were comparable, we concluded
that average city density is approximately equal to average county density.
By extending this relation, we assumed that the density at any accident
location could be approximated by the city density and hence the county density.
Therefore, as a first approximation, we assumed
D ~ _ (5)
- Wealso note that fo_ a given release amount, by integrating over the area of
exposure
,, f E(dAir) da = S
A
where S denotes the surface integral of exposure and is a constant.
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That is, the surface integralof exposure is simply the number of fibers
releasedtimes the settlingvelocity. Hence, no matter what the weather
conditionsare, all fibers contributethe same incrementsto the surface
integral. Hence '_
If(r) .f E(dAlr) dr : ] f(r) S dr : S
1.
(6)
r A r
Combining (3), (5) and (6) the average number of failures for a given
amount released is:
DS
o _ _ (7)
0
This equation was one of the two key results of the analysis. The !
other key result was that the distribution of the number of failures
is approximately Poisson with mean -No" Although this would follow
directly if it could be assumed that the individual failures are negligibly
correlated, this assumption did not appear to be immediately justifiable.
The following represents an alternative approach to a justification
for the Poisson distribution.
Consider the random variable for the number of failures given N--o.
In computing Ro there were two types of averaging performed. The first
type was averaging the random failures given a release (i.e., the
average in N_). The second type was averaging over release conditions
such as stability class, wind direction, etc.
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Given the exponential failure law, then the number of failures given
r and standard deviationthe average Nr is Poisson with mean equal to No
equal to _N r The to_aJ variation basea on a.tormuJa for conditional0 "
expectation (See, for example, Parzen, Stochastic Processes, P 55)
is
m
Var(No. FailuresINo) = E(Var No. FailureslN ro)
+ Var(E FailuresIN_)
i
J
: EN_ + Var N_
The first term EN_ is the Poisson variation. The second term is t_jhe
variation due to release condition and density variations.
Weperformed some computations to assess the relative influence of
each type of variation. Table A-I presents examples of total deviations
_ rfor various values of EN . It is assumed in the Table that Var No is
four times ENd, that is, the standard deviation due to release conditions
and density variations is double the mean. This was simply an arbitrary
but in our judgement conservative assumption made to test the importance
of the Poisson variation. Column 1 is ENd, Column 2 is the Poisson
u
standard deviation which is equal to the standard deviation of the
L
number of failures assuming a Poisson assumption is valid. That is,
the second column is the square root of the first term of the right
hand s_de of the above equation. Column 3 is the square root of the
right hand side of the above equation.
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The table shows that the assumptionof a Poisson Processwith parameter
NO has virtuallythe same variationas the actual process. Most of the
actual expectations were substantially below the values in the table,
The highest expectations were household goods for the New York City
counties. For these cases, the densities were on the order of
56,000 per square mile and the Eo value, incorporating average threshold
values was 3.4 x 109 . Thus, the maximumN--o for a helicopter total
destruction release was
,2
N 56,000 mi-2 1 ml= x x 1.09 kg
o 16092 2
m I
x 109 f . .032 m . 3.4 x 109 f seckg sec 2
m
= .218
No other category except telephone exchanges and forklift equipment yields
values that even come close,to these household goods values. Further-
more, for the high density equipment categories, _ the densities and
hence No will not show a great deal of variation with respect to
release conditions.
The conclusion of this analysis is that the process can be approximated
by a Poisson process with parameter No as determined by Equation (7).
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TABLEA-I
EXAMPLESOF VARIATION OF FAILURES
EXPECTATION POISSONSTANDARDEVIATION TOTAL DEVIATION
ENr
.25 .5 .7
.i0 .32 .37
.05 .22 .23
.01 .i .i01
.005 .071 .071
.001 .032 .032
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To account for different equipment types, it was noted that the number
of total failures is the sumof individual Poisson processes.
A.3 POISSONMODEL
Let
i = I, . , N be the counties
j = I, , M be the equipment SIC category combinations
k = I, . , R be the cases of amount released
E
I
Let
_ijk : SkDij/Ej (8)
where
Sk = Surface integral of exposure for release type k
Dij = Density of equipment in county i
1
Ej Average reciprocal exposure to failure for equipment jincorporating transfer function (This was assumed to be inde-
pendent of county).
The _ijk is the parameter of the Poisson Process for equipment type j,
county i and release type k. Then for all equipment types, the para- _
meters for the Poisson Process (which is the sum of individual Poisson
Processes ) is
= s _ijk (9)
_ik j
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Then, for general aviation CF releases:
P. = Prob(countyi)_ weighted factor of local and.itinerantoperations
J (see Appendix B)
Qk : Prob(release k)
-_ik (_ik)n (IO)p(n) = Prob(n failures)= _ PIQke n!
i,k
and the average failure rate is
_= z Piqk x (11)i,k ik
Because all of the x values will be small, the calculations of the hro-
babilities in (I0) will be needed only for a limited set of values. In
order to compute conditional risk profiles, probabilities of equipment
types given a release needed to be computed. Bayes' theorem is utilized
for this computation as follows. The prior probability of scenario k is
. PiQk
If n failures from a release are observed then the posterior probabilitY
of scenario k is
p(i,kln) = .P(nJi,k)P.(j,k.).
F. p(nJi,k ) p(i,k)
i,k
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PiQk e 'k!Xik)n/nt
-h i _-
_ Piqk e k(Xik)n/n!i,k
-)_
PiQk e ik(},ik )n
"kik()_!k) ni _',kPi Qke
Now given n failures from one release under scenario i, k, the pro-
bability of any one being type j is
p(j In,l,k) :_i]k
Ik
Thus, given n failures from one release, the probability that the
scenario is i, k, and the failure is type j is
P(j,i,kln)
Xijk -Xik(x n-I
-Xik(x n P ePiQk e ik) kik iQk ik) XI]k
= p(jln,l,k) < p(l,kln): = "_..
-XIk(x n tk nZPIQk e ik) _P'Qk e, (;_Tk) "'
A-IO
Thus,
p(jln) = _ p(j,ikln)
i,k
(12)
-XIk(x n-I
_PQk e Xi,k i ik) ijk
Y PiQk e 'k(Xik)ni,k
For the case n = l, it is seen that
where
_. : s PiQkXIjj i,k k
The computationof the risk profile is based on the expressionsfor
p(n) and_j. The p(n) values were used by themselvesto represent
a risk profilefor a single accidentand were used to computemoments
for.numbersof failures. Due to equation (13) and the fact that multiple
failureswere unlikelyP-iwas used to compute aggregatedcost moments
rather than p(jln).
A-!I

APPENDIXB: ANALYSISOF GENERALAVIATION ACCIDENTS
B.I INTRODUCTION
In order to estimate the potential risks due to carbon fiber releases
from general aviation accidents, it is necessary to quantify the proba-
bility of an accident in any given county. This chapter presents the
model and the associated analysis for general aviation accidents. The
model is based on accident and operation records compiled by the National
Transportation Safety Board. It incorporates two probability factors:
the probability of a general aviation fire accident and the conditional
probability that the accident will be a given type. The type includes
aircraft class, damage category, and whether the accident occurs during
cruise or on or near the airport. Factors such as weather and proximity
r
to airport are discussed but not utilized in the model. This appendix
also includes a discussion of how the accident model is interfaced with
the risk profile calculation. The profile is based on county data and
thus requires the conditional probability that a given accident occurs
in a given county.
B.2 DATABASEAND IMPORTANTVARIABLES
The analysis of general aviation accidents was based on National
Transportation Safety Board data tapes for nine years between 1968 and
1976. The tapes include accidents of U.S. and foreign-registered civil
aircraft that occurred in the U.S., and contain over 400 items of infor-
mation for each accident or incident. This includes detailed information
about the accident conditions, the aircraft involved, the weather, the
pilot, and the airport if the accident occurred in the proximity of one.
In analyzing these tapes we focused upon accidents caused by fire or
explosion and accidents in which fire or explosion occurred after impact.
3058 accidents of both types can be identified for the nine year period,
and for each of these the following items of data were extracted for
further consideration:
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1. File number
2. Date of occurrence
3. Location
4. Type of aircraft _
5. Number of engines
6. Type of power
7. Aircraft damage
8. Fire after impact
9. Type of accident
I0. Phase of operation
II. Altitude of occurrence
12. Conditions of light
13. Type of weather
14 Airport proximity
15 Lateral distance from runway centerline
16 Ter rain
17 Cei I i ng
18 Visibility
19 Precipitation
20 Location of fire I
21 Fire damage
The objective in analyzing these data for the 3,058 fire accidents
was to develop an expression of the form Pt(X) that represents the probability
of an accident of type t under conditions X. In examining a variable
to determine its impact on the accident probability function, two criteria
were applied. First, is the accident probability significantly influenced
by the variable in a manner that can be utilized in a general aviation
accident model? Second, does the variable affect carbon fiber dispersion?
In analyzing the data for the fire or explosion accidents for general
aviation, we identifed the following variables that can affect accident
probabilities or release condition.
I. Type of aircraft 4. Weather
2. Phase of operation 5. Location relative to airport
3. Level of damage
The types of aircraft are classified by number of engines, type of
power and the existence of fixed or non-fixed wings. The number of
accidents for each type is presented in Table B-I. In analyzing some
of the other accident variables, it was noted that aircraft type affects
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TABLE B-I
GENERALAVIATION ACCIDENT TYPES INVOLVING FIRE (1968-1976)
General Type of Aircraft
Fixed Wing 2795
Helicopter 244
Glider l
Balloon 15
Blimp 0 !
Dirigible 0
Rocket 0
Convertiplane 0
Gyroplane 3
Other 0
Number of Engines
0 15
l 2354
2 666
3 0
4 23
Type of Power
Reciprocating Engine 2912
Turbojet Engine 32
Turboprop Engine 51
Turbofan 3
None(Glider) 15
Turboshaft 45
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variablessuch as extent of damage and phase of operation. In addition,
the differenttypes of general aviationaircraft may be utilizingdiffer-
ent amounts of carbon fiber composite. The model consequently utilized
three classes of general aviation aircraft and these are discussed in
the next section.
The phase of operationaffects carbon fiber releaseconditionsand
extent of damage three ways. First, fires may be more intensedepending
on the phase of operation. Take-offaccidents,for example,would involve
more fuel. Second,cruise accidents,becausethey take place off the
ground,may result in releaseswith differentdispersioncharacteristics.
Third, accidentstaking place on or near airportsmay take place in more
densely settledareas than for cruise accidents. This, of course,greatly
affectsthe economic impactof a release.
Because of the methodology utilized in analyzing the risk of carbon
fiber usage in general aviation aircraft, the first two effects above of
phase of operation are significant only to the extent that they affected
the amount of carbon fiber released. The reason for this is that the
surface integral method discussed in Section 1.2 requires only the amount
of fibers released. The third effect above, due to density of facilities
and population, is an important part of the model. The split of general
aviation accidents between cruise and on-airport location was utilized
to determine county locations of accidents.
The four phases of operationidentifiedby NTSB include:
• Take off
e Landing
• Cruise
e Static or Taxi
The actual split utilized in the model is:
e Cruise ,_
• On or near airport
NTSBrecognizes several levels of damage in aircraft accidents and inci-
dents. It is assumed that a carbon fiber release can occur only if the
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level of damageis total destruction or substantial damage. For each
level of damagea different amount of carbon fibers released was assumed.
Weather is an important variable in aircraft safety. In classifying
weather conditions for accidents, NTSB recognizes the three different
clasSifications.
e VFR - Visual Flight Rules
e IFR - Instrument Flight Rules
• Below Minimum
This classification appears to be a sufficent statistic for weather
variables in terms of their effect on accident probabilities. For air
carrier accidents it was noted that 49% of the relevant accidents occurred
in IFR or below minimum conditions. The probability of IFR or below
minimum weather at the major hub airports (weighted by operations)i is
only 11%and this indicates that the probability of accident per oper-
ation in IFR weather is substantially larger than for VFR weather. For
general aviation accidents and incidents, the percentage of IFR and Below
Minimum accidents is a great deal lower. Of the 3,058 accidents and
incidents in the data base, only 16%of the non-static accidents occurred
in IFR or below minimum weather. This may be due to the lower incidence
of general aviation flights in IFR weather but in any case the percentage
is a great deal closer to the national incidence of IFR weather than the
percentage for air carrier accidents. Weconcluded thatthe weather
variable need not play as important a role in a general aviation model.
The percentage of IFR and below minimum accidents was higher for
larger general aviation aircraft (greater than one engine or non-recipro-
cating engine) and may also be correlated with the operational phase
(cruise or on or near airport). However, the effect of the IFR probability
at any airport is limited. For air carriers, even given the large increase
in accident probabilities due to IFR weather, the weather factor does not
create substantial adjustments in airport accident probabilities. Because
weather does not have a substantial impact on general aviation accident
statistics and because of the difficulty involved in making such adjust-
ments, we did not incorporate weather into the general aviation accident
model.
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The final variable considered was accident location for those acci-
dents occurring on or near airports. In NTSB reports, distance from the
edge of the nearest runway and lateral distance from the runway were _'
reported for accidents taking place off the airport. Distance from the
edge of the runway was classified into I/4 mile intervals up to 1 mile,
1 mile intervals up to 5 miles, and a single category for beyond 5 miles.
In examining the distance distributions for different types of general
aircraft phases and planes, there are three significantly different dis-
tance distributions. These distributions are for:
o Accidents during the take-off phase
e Accidents of single-engine planes during landing
0 Accidents of other than single-engine planes during
landing
However, the risk model for general aviation is not capable of utilizing
the fine detail associated with the probabilistic distance distribution
for accidents taking place near the airport. For this reason we did not
utilize distance distributions within the accident model. Accidents
are classified as taking place either during cruise or on or near air-
port.
It should also be noted that because of the large incidence of cruise
accidents for general aviation, a third location variable, altitude was
also considered. Table B-2 presents an altitude distribution for the
accident and incident for which altitude was recorded. Although there
are a substantial number of accidents taking place in the air, we again
did not consider altitude because of the surface integration technique
which considers only total amount released as a relevant variable.
B.3 ANALYSISOF ACCIDENTVARIABLES
In view of the qualifications on location and weather noted in the
previous section the only variables analyzed for the purposes of model
development were:
e Type of aircraft
e Phase of operation
e Level of damage
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TABLE B-2
ALTITUDE OF CRUISE ACCIDENTS AND INCIDENTS FOR
GENERAL AVIATION AIRCRAFT (1968-1976)
Altitude of Occurrence Number of Accidents
(Feet)
o - 5oo 58
500 - l,OO0 41
l,OOO - 2,000 36
2,OOO- 5,OOO 75
5,OOO- I0,OOO 55
I0,0OO - 20,000 20
20,000 - 30,000 2
3O,OOO l
On the Ground 974
Unknown 455
Tota I 1717
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In addition to an analysis of these three variables in terms of
accident frequencies, statistics have been compared for the beginning,
the middle and end of the nine-year period to assess the possible
existence of a time trend.
The data utilized in performing the analysis are presented in a
series of tables that follow. The analysis also included some other
data which were omitted from this report because the variables
analyzed in these data are not ultimately utilized in the model.
These variables include IFR-VFR weather frequencies and distance from
the end of the runway for various phases of operation and aircraft
type categories. Weather data are presented in aggregate for each i
subset of the overall data base, and the distance distribution for
accidents taking place near the airport are presented for the
overall data base. These data are presented for general reference
and for corroboration of some of the conclusions presented in the
previous section. For example, it is noted that the probability of
IFR or below minimum is 16% but is somewhat higher for multiple
engine and non-reciprocating craft. This, however, can be explained
by the high incidence of on-airport accidents for these classifica-
tions, since on-airport accidents show a much higher percentage of
IFR or below minimum accidents. Weather, however, is not judged
to be a relevent variable for the purposes of analyzing risk. (It
can also be noted that accidents taking place near airports comprise
a distribution with most of its mass at small distances.)
Tables presented include the following:
Table B3 - Aggregate Data Base Statistics
Table B4 - Distance Statistics
Table B5 - Statistics for Fixed Wing Craft
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TABLEB-3
AGGREGATE DATA BASE STATISTICS GENERAL AVIATION (1968-1976).
TOTAL PLANE ACCIDENTS OR INCIDENTS 305@.
..... Wl Tli_F. I RE INVOLVEMENT ...............................
LEVEL.OF. DAMAGE ...............
SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGE 359+
TOTAL DESTRUCTION 2680,
M I NGR/NONE/UNKNG _N 19.
PHASE OF OPERATION/WEATHER
$IAT IC/UNKNOWN 48,
NUNSTAT IC 301 O,
IFR 392,
VFR 2521,
_EL MIN/UJ_KNC_N/NOI REPORTED 91.
iJIIASE OF OPERATICN/LEVEL OF DAMAGE
TAKECFF 622,
SUI3STANT [AL DAMAGE 90,
IOTAL DESTRUCT ICN 531,
Ml NOR/NONE/UNKNOWN I.
LAND [NG 638,
SUBSTANT IAL DAMAGE 100,
TGTAL DESTRUCTION 533.
.... MI NGR/NONE/UNKN0 WN ......... 5....
CRUISE 1717.
SUBSTANTIAL OAMAGE 140e
_.. TOTAL DESTRUCTIf.]N . ............ 1505,=
MI NOR/NONE/UNKNOWN 12.
STATIC/TAXI 58"=
..SUSSTANT IAL DAMAG E .................................... 28"=
TOTAL DESTRUCTION 29.
MI NO,q/NONE/UNKNC WN I +
_ .UNKN(] _N 2..3 •
SUI3 S TAN T [ AL---E)AMA GE .......... -- ............................. I_-
TOTAL DESTRUCTION 22,,,
NI NOR/NONE/UNKNOWN O.
REASON FOR FIRE
-¢AU S'E lg'l.
RESULT 2867.
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TABLE B-4
DISTANCE STATISTICS FOR GENERAL AVIATION FIRES
Take-off Landing
On Airport 209 257
On Seaplane Base l 0
On Heliport 7 5
On Barge/Ship/Platform 0 0
In Traffic Pattern 148 143
Within I/4 mile 83 24
Within I/2 mile 38 24
Within 3/4 mile 13 8
Within l mile 25 22
Within 2 miles 16 22
Within 3 miles 2 17
Within 4 miles 4 15
Within 5 miles 2 9
Beyond 5 miles 58 84
Unknown/Not Reported 16 8
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TABLE B-5
STATISTICS FOR FIXED WING CRAFT
TOTAL PLANE ACCICEIxTS Of_ INCIBENIS 2795,,
ilIll- FIRE II_VCLYENENT
f
LEVEL OF DAMAGE
SUBSTANTIAL DAN_CL 30E,
TOTAL DESTRUCT ICrx 246_,
MIING6/IqCNE/UNKKCI_I_ I_,
PHASE OF DPERATICk/_EATHEt_
STATIC/UNKNUmK 27° !,
NONETAT IC 2 758.,
[Ft< 3_5.
VFR 2.287,,
BEL MIh/UNKKCI_I_/NI_T GEP[JFiTEC _.6o
PHASE OF L)PERATICI_/LEVEL GF CA_PG[Z
TAKECFF 5_4,,_o
SUeSTANTI_I.. DAI,'..AGE ......... 784, .
TOTAL DESTRUCT ][1'-, 505,
M [ NG I-_/NOINE/UNK N[ _h, I •
LANDING - _8_,,, ................
SUeSTANT IAL BAPAC-E 90,
TOTAL DESTRUCT lCt', 494,,
P,! I_G_/NCNE/UNKNC ltN 5,_
Club! SE I 56 ! ,
SUBSTANTIAL DAWAGE 116.
TOTAL DESTNUCT I_N 1433,
M] 1_1_/NONEIUNK I_ C _IN .12.
5TATICITAXI 41,
SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGE 23,
TOTAL D[STNUCT |_I', ....................17.o
I_ I NC_/NI3hEIU I_KEC _I_ I •
UNKNC_N 20,
SUBSTANTIAL OAHAGE ............1 _
TOTAL DES TRUCT :IC I_ I_,,
M[ NI3_/NONEIUI_ K KE IlK O,
REASON FL]R FIRE
CAIJSE 175,,,
RESGLI 2520.
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TABLE B-6
STATISTICS FOR NON-FIXED WING CRAFT
TOIAL PLANE ACCIDENTS OR IhCIGEhTS 203.
• ITP FIRE [hVGLIE_EhT
LEVEL OF DAMAGE
SUBSTANTIAL O_NAGL 51,
TOTAL D_'SIRUC I ICN 212.
W INC_/NCNE/UNK hC I_N O.
PHASE OF GPERAIIC_/_EATHEN
STATIC/UNKN_h II.
NONEIATIC 252.
IFR 7-
VF_ 2_0°
BEL MIN/UNKNZI_/NOT HEPCBIEC 5,
PHASE OF bPERATIChlLEVEL GI- CA_A_E
TAKEGFF 38,
SUBSIANIIAL CA_AGE ....... 12.
TOTAL DESTRUCTICh 2_.
MINO_/NONE/UNKNE_N O,
LANDING ........ 4_4 ..................
SUBSTANTIAL OAWA_E |0.
IOTAL DESIRUCTICN 39,
MINC_/NONE/UNKNC'N O,
C UlSE .................................
SUBSTANTIAL DAWAGE 24,
TOTAL DESTRUCTICh 132.
WIN_/N_NEIUNKNC_ .......... D. ....
STATIC/TAXI 17,
SU_TANI IAL DAVACE 5.
TUTAL _ESTRUCTI_N ............................................. _2. ,.
WI NC_/NONE/UNKh£_N O,
UNKNOWN 3e
SUESIANTIAL CARAGE ............... _--
TOTAL DESTRUCTICh 3,
_INCF/NONE/UNKhCWN O.
REASON FOR FIRE
CAUSE ............. _- ................
RESULT 2_7.
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TABLE B-7
STATISTICS FOR ONE-ENGINE CRAFT
TOTAL PLANE ACCIDEETS OR IkCICENTS 2354,
ilTH FIRE INVGL_E_ENT
LEVEL OF DANAGE
SUBSTANTIAL DAIv_GE 24_.
TOTAL DESTRUCT|CI_ 2105,
I NI3_/NONE/UNKI_C TIN 0 •
PHASE _F OPERAIICN/IEATHER (
STATIC/UNKNOIh 36,
NONSTATIC 2316.
IFR 237,
VFR 202_,
BEL M!&/UNKNC_h/_CT REPZ_TED 55,
PHASE OF UPERATICk/LEVEL OF [.AIV/bC-E
IAKECFF 4 72.
SUBSTANTIAL I]AI_AGE .... bg,
TOTAL DESTRUCT ICh 40_.
M [ NOLO/N{]NE/UNK hC _h 0 •
LAhDING ................41.5. .....
SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGE (_e,
TOTAL DFSTRUCI ICl_ 34g,
MI NOR/NONE/UNKhl_ Wh {}.
cr_ul Se i412' ........
SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGE 103,
TOTAL DESTRUCTICh 130G,
_I I_FJF_rN 0 N E/U N K I_CIAI_ ...........0,
STATICITAX I 34.
SU_S IANT IAL OANAGE I(}*
TOTAL DESTRUCIICN ..24,
_I I_C I;IN {Jh E/Uh; K I_C _ I_ O,
"_. IJNKNG_N 21.
SUBSTANTIAL CA_AC-E . 1.
TOTAL DESTRUCT ICh 20.
_,INOR/NONE/U_KhC TiN O,
I_EASON FOR FIRE
CA LJSE | O_.
I_E SbLT 22Qe •
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TABLE B-8
STATISTICS FOR OTHERTHAN ONE-ENGINE CRAFT
TOTAL PLAhE ACCICEI_TS OR ]NCICEI_T5 704.
• I Th F IRE INVOL_EMEI_T
L_VEL OF CAMAGE
bb_SIANTIAL CAW_CE 11C,
IUTAL. DESTHUCTIZk 57E,
_I_C_/NONEtUNKhCIh Ig,
PHASE OF OPERATIChJWEATHER
STATIC/UNKNC_N 1C,
NONSIATIC eg4o !_
IFR 15_,
VFR ...:_GI,
BEL MIN/UNKNE_k/NOT REPOFTEE 3_,
PHASE DF OPERATICB/LEVEL OF [AW_GE
TAKEOFF 150,
_U_IANIIAL DA_.AGE ............. 21.
TOTAL DESTRUCTIEh 128,
_INCF/NONE/UNK_[_B I.
LANOIJ_-.G .223. ......................
SUBSTANTIAL CA_ACE 34.
T_TAL DESTRUCTICB le4o
_INC_/NCNE/UNKNC_N 5,
CRUISE 305,
SUeSTANTIAL CAWACE 37.
TOTAL DEST_UCTICh 25_,
_INC_/N_NE/U_K_C_ ............. 1.2.
STAII C/TAX I 24 •SdBSTANT_AL CAWACE 1_,
TOTAL DESTRU.CIICh .......................................5
NI BC_/NONE/UhKBE _h I,
DNKNOWN 2,
SU_STANIIAL DAN_GE ........................ 0,
1OIAL DESTHUCTICh 2,
_IhCF/NCNE/U_KM[Wk 0, '_
t_E#SCh FOR FIRE
CADSE .B_.
RESBLT _I_,
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TABLE B-9
STATISTICS FOR RECIPROCATING ENGINE CRAFT
IOIAL PLANE ACCIOE_TS OR I_CIDE_TS 2912-
_ITF FIRE INVCL_EME_T
LEVEL OF DAMAGE
SU.]SIANT IAL CA fv,a_E 331.
ILIAL DE SllqbC I IC t', 25{5.
le] NC t:;/NCNE/UNKINC t_N lb.
PHASE OF OPERAIICNI_EATHER
SIAIIC/UNKNOW_ 44,
NONSTATIC 266e.
IFR 36S.
VFR 24_.
_EL MIN/UNKNC_N/NOT REPORTED 80,
PHASE OF OPERAIIC_./LEVEL OF EA_A_E
IAKECFF £&4,
5UF3EIANIIAL 13A_ACE . 82.,
TOTAL DESTRUCTICt_ 51 I.
_I NCEI/NONE/IJNK hC lIN 1.
LANDING ...................... Sgl* ..............
SUBS]ANT IAL DAMACE 90.
1DIAL DESTRUCIlCt_ 491.
I N6R/NONE/U_K_C _ 4.
c L,I - "i -S3.................
SU_]S TANT I AL DAP_GE 132.
TOTAL DESTRUCT IC_ 1510,
W l NGR/NONE/UK KM:IIK ......... 41,
5TAT ICITAX I 52,
SUBSTANTIAL DANA_E 2(5,
TOTAL DESTRUCT IC_w ...........................26.
MI NL]F/NfJNEtUI_KI_C mix 0 •
LhKNC}I_N 22,
SUBSTANI IAL DAWAGE ......... 1,,
TOTAL I)ESTIabCT ICN 21.
_1 NCIR/NUNE/UNK _C _1_, O.
REASON FOR FIRE
(AUSE 117.
RESbLT 2735 ,
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TABLE B-10
STATISTICS FOR NON-RECIPROCATING ENGINE CRAFT _
IOIAL PLANE ACCIOENT5 OR INCIDENTS 146,
_[TH FIRE INVCLYEMEhT
LEVEL OF DAMAGE
SUESTANTIAL CAW_G_L 2e,
TOTAL DESIRUCI IC_ 115.
_INGN/NONE/UNK_C_N 3.
P_ASE OF OPERAII_N/IEAThE_
STATIC/UNKNC_N 4.
NONSTATIC 142.
IF_ 23,
VF_ 10e.
B_L MIN/UNKNZ_N/NCT REPGAIED II.
P_ASE OF OPERATI{h/LEVEL GF £A_ACE
TAKECFF 2_.
SUBSTANTIAL DAmaGE .... 8.
TOTAL DESTRUCTICh 20,
MINOEINONE/UEKKC_h O.
LANDING .....4.7. ..........
SUBSTANTIAL DAN_QE TO.
TOTAL DESTRU{TICK 36,
M[NCN/NONE/UhK_C_ 1.
c_I SF e4.
SUBSTANT IAL DAHAGE @-
1OTAL DESTRUCT 1_ 55.
_ I N_/NONE/UNK_C_ ....... I.
SIATICITAXI 6.
_UBSIANTIAL DAWAGE 2,
TOTAL DESTRUCTICN ...................._-
NINC_/NCNE/UNK_C_N I-
bNKNQ_N 1.
SU_SIANTIAL DAWAGE ............. _-
TUTAL DESTRUCT ICN 1,
_I NO_/NONE/UNK_C_N 0.
_E4SON FOR FIRE
CAUSE I_.
_[ISULT 132,
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TABLE B-II
" STATISTICS FORTHE PERIOD1968-!970
TOTAL PLANE ACCIDEhIS OR IhCIDEhTS 1068.
mITP FIRE IhVCLVEMENT
LEVEL OF DAMAGE
SUBSTANTIAL DAWAGE 113. ...........
TDTAL DEST_UC] IEh _48.
WI NC_/NONE/UhKhCmN 7.
PHASE OF OPERAIIOhI_EATHER
STATIC/UNKNOWN 20 .
NONSTAT IC I 04e.
IFR 1170
VFR 913,
BEL MIN/UNKNCIN/NOT _EPCRTED 18.
PHASE OF OPERATIONILEVEL OF _A_AGE
TAKEOFF 233,
SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGE ..31,
IU'TAL DESTRUCTIC_ 202.
MINC_/NONE/UNKNCaN O,
LAND IhG ..... 231 *......................
SUBSTANTIAL DA_A GE 37.
TOTAL DESTRUCT ICh Igl,
MINOR/NONE/UhKhCIN 30
CRUISE "574, ...........
SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGE 35.
TOTAL DESTRUCTION 535.
MINGR/NONE/UhKN_ih ............_ ,
STATIC/TAXI 17.
SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGE IO0
TOTAL DESTRUCTIGh .... 7,
MINOR/NONE/UNKNCWh O.
UNKNOWN 13.
SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGE ..... O,
TOTAL DESIRUCTICN 13.
MINCR/NONE/UNKMCIN O,
REASON FOE FIRE
CAbSE _1- ......
RESULT i 007.
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TABLE B-12
STATISTICS FORTHEPERIOD 1971-1973
TOTAL PLANE ACCIDENTS OR INCIDENTS 910,
• IT_ FIRE IEVCL_ENENT
LEVEL CF DAMAGE
SU@_TANIIAL DAW#GE 1150
TGTAL DESTRUCTIOh 7890
_INC_/NQNE/UhKhC_h 6e
PhAS_ OF OPERATIEF/_EATHE_
STATIC/UNKNOWN II.
NONSTATIC 899,
IFR llg,
VFR .747,
BEL MINIUNKNO_N/NOT _EPC_TED 33.
PHASE OF OPERATIOI_,/LEVI':L OF £AI_AGF_
TAKEOFF 178,
SUB_IANT IAL DAM,AGE 29,,
TOTAL DESIRUCT I[l_ 148.
NI I_R/NOhEIUNKhC ibh I.
LANDING ....... 192e .............
,_UBSTANI IAL DA M/bGE 33.
TOTAL DESTRUCTICN 158,
_I NOR/NONE/UNK I_C_h I •
CRlal SE 52i. "
SUBSTANTIAL DA_CE 45.
TOTAL DESTRUC'T IC_ 472,
MINOR/ NONE/UNKh[ lib 4 •
SIATIC/TAXI 13,
SUBSTANTIAL D_ Iv_CE 80
10TAL DESTRUCIION ...... 5.
MINOEINONEIUNKN[ _h 0.
bl_K N(_ lIN t5 .
SUB-_TANTIAL DAMAGE ......... 0.
TOTAL DESTRUCT ICl% 6,,
l_I NCR/NONEIUNKh{- i_N O.
I'_EASCh FOR FIRE
CAUSE 630
_ESbLI 847,
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TABLE B-13
STATISTICS FOR THE PERIOD 1974-1976
"- TOTAL PLANE ACCII]FKTS fir [I_CIBEKTS 1080.
WITP FII-E IhV(JLVEMEI_T
LEVEL. 13F CAMAGE
5U'._5 TAN T [ AL C A 1,'4 GE 131.
TL]IAL D_STRUCT ICI_ g43,
l_lI_iZ_II'4L]I_EIbNK I_C _f', 6 ,,
PHAS[! UF Lj_IS.i._ATICI_/WEATI"_E_
STAT IC/UNKNO_D, 17.
NCJN E TAT [ C ! 063.
If- 156,
VF f; P._7o
UEL tAII_/UhKN£._hlNOT hEPI31_TEB 4C°
PHASE OF UPERATICI_/LEVEL CF g/IMAGE
IAKECFF 21 I •
SUDSTANT IAL BAI_A GE ................................... 30°
TOTAL DP_-ST_UCT ICK I_I.
IvlNCI4/NCNE/UNKNC_aN O.
LANDING ........................................ 2.15.,. ..................
SUL35 TANT IAL CAN#CE 30,
TOTAL DESTRUCT IGN I_4,
_INC_/NI_NE/UNKNCIIN I°
SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGE 60,
TGTAL D,--STAUCT ICh 55_,
MI hCfi/NQNE/U_KhC_N ......................................... q'" ....
5TAT. IC/TAXI 28,
SUBSTAN fIAL DAIVAGE I0.
TOTAL DESTRUCTICN ........................................ 17..
MI hC_/NChE/UhKhC_,N I°
LNKNQV, N 4*
SUL]5 TANT i AL DAMAG2 ........................................ .1o
TI]TAL DESTRUCT ICh _-
MI NC[4/NQNE/LJNKNC_,N 0,
,qEASt]N I:'..)R FIRL-
f
(AL, S F . .67, ......
FiE SL,LI" I 0 13 °
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Table B6 - Statistics for Non-Fixed Wing Craft
Table B7 - Statistics for One-engine craft
Table B8 - Statistics for Other Than One'engine Craft
Table B9 - Statistics for Reciprocating Engine Craft
Table BIO- Statistics for Non-reciprocating Craft
Table BII- Statistics for the Period 1968-1970
Table BI2- Statistics for the Period 1971-1973
Table BI3- Statistics for the Period 1974-1976
The first statistical tests examined differences in the statis,
tics for the three 3-year periods in the data base. These included
chi-squared tests for the following:
e Phase (Take-off, landing, or cruise) versus 3-year period
• Phase/weather versus 3-year period
• On or off airport versus 3-year period
• Distance from airport versus 3-year period.
There was no significance in any of these tests with one minor
exception. For the phase and weather data, there was an increase
during the nine-year period in below minimum or unknown accidents
for weather. (This may be due to reporting practices.) The test
based on data with a deletion of the unknown or below minimum cate-
gory shows no significance in differences between the three 3-year
periods.
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Once the validity of the full nine year data base was established,
the model was developed in a straightforward manner. For each class of
aircraft an empirical probability was estimated giving the conditional
probability that the accident took place either on or near the airport
or during cruise. For each of these phases the conditional probability
of substantial damage or total destruction was estimated. One class of
aircraft with unusual characteristics was non-fixed wing or non-powered
craft. These craft showed a different statistics from fixed wing powered
craft and in addition will be utilizing different amounts of carbon fibers
in 1973. Most of these aircraft are, of course, helicopters.
i
In examining the statistics for non-reciprocating engine planes and
planes with more than one engine, some differences from one-engine re-
ciprocating craft were noted. There was a higher percentage of on-airport
accidents and a higher percentage of substantial damage accidents for
these craft. Both of these classes of aircraft represent larger planes
than single engine reciprocating engine craft and are logical candidates
for consolidation in any classification scheme. In fact, there are no
significant differences in phase of operation or in damage probabilities
conditional on phase between the two classifications. Although there is
a great deal of overlap among the two classes, that is, most non-recipro-
cating engine craft are also aircraft that have more than one engine, the
similarit% of statistics shows a certain pattern for larger general avia-
tion aircraft. Because of this the final breakdown of aircraft was estab-
lished as follows:
e Non-Fixed wing or non-powered craft
• Single reciprocating engine aircraft
• Multiple or non-reciprocating engine aircraft
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The statistics for these classes are presented in Table AI4.
The conditional probabilities of aircraft type, cruise, on airport and
damage were based on this table. As noted, the major differences
between the statistics of the larger aircraft and the smaller single re-
ciprocating engine craft are the larger percentages of on airport acci- _
dents and substantial damage accidents. To some extent, these differences
are correlated. That is, larger general aviation aircraft have higher
percentages of substantial damage accidents because on aircraft (or near
airport) accidents have higher percentages of substantial damage accidents.
In fact, the conditional damage probabilities given the major phase cate-
gory (on or near airport versus cruise) were very similar.
B.4 GENERALAVIATION ACCIDENTRATESAND FINAL MODEL i
!
Table BI5 presents accident rates and total aircraft hours and miles
flown for the period 1969-1978. It is noted that the number of fatal and
total accidents has remained approximately constant since about 1972 while
total activity has increased. The model, however, does not require a per-
mile, per-hour, or per-operation accident rate. Total number of expected
accidents per year can be allocated to the various counties according to
some measure of activity. Thus, despite the decrease in accident rate
that has been observed over the past several years, the number of accidents
has not substantially varied, and we assumed that the expected number of
general aviation fire accidents is 3,058 divided by 9, or 340 accidents per
year. 25% (corresponding to the percent of fleet that carry CF) or 85
would involve CF aircraft.
It should be noted that the same manufacturers who produce general
aviation aircraft also produce the aircraft that are utilized by air taxi
and commuter carriers. Wedid not perform a separate study of air taxi
commuter accidents as they do not represent a significant number of opera-
tions. In 1978, for example, the number of operations for each aircraft
carrier category at F.A.A. control tower airports were:
B-22
Air Carrier 10,063,259
Air Taxi 3,773,484
G/A 50,798,779
Military 2,537,91 2
Total 67,173,434
The 1990 forecast, however, from the Wharton long-term industry and
economic forecasting model I predicts 8.4 million air taxi and commuter
operations. In order to develop an estimate for the impact of air taxi
and commuter operations on the national risk profile, we adjusted upward
the 340 accident per year to account for air taxi and commuter operations.
This adjustment factor was estimated to be .02 which is consistent with
the total estimatedlair taxi and commuter operations and general aviation
operations in 1993 of 12.5 and 293.5 million, respectively. Thus the
total number of estimated general aviation and air taxi and commuter fire
accidents was 354 per year of which 88 would involve aircraft carrying CF.
This procedure, of course, assumes that the accident rate for air taxi and
commuter operations is the same as for general aviation operations and
that the resulting geographic distribution and release statistics are
similar.
In developing the final conditional probabilities of damage and type,
the figures in Table BI4 were adjusted to account for different growth
rates of the different classes of aircraft. As noted in Table 2-I, which
was used in project future fleet sizes, the annual growth rates have been
6.3%, 4.8%, and 8.6% for multi-engine craft, single-engine craft and rotor
craft, respectively. Wewould expect relative accident frequencies for
the three categories in TableBl4to grow at approximately the same rate.
(Thus, for example, the relative share of helicopter accidents should
increase.) The table of final conditional probabilities reflects these
growth rates using 1973 as the base year for the Table BI4 data.
1FAAAviation Forecast, Fiscal years 1979 to 1990 U.S. Department of
Transportation, page 35.
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TABLE B-14
STATISTICS FOR FINAL CLASSIFICATIONS
GENERAL AVIATION FIRES (1968-1976)
Cruise On or Near Airport
Total Cruise Total Airport
Substantial Destruction Unknown Total Substantial Destruction Unknown Total
Non-Fixed Wing
or Non-Powered 22 125 0 147 24 74 0 98
, Single Reciprocating
Engine 81 1182 0 1263 121 720 0 841
Multiple or Jet Engine 37 258 12 307 74 321 7 402
Total 140 1565 12 1717 219 Ill5 7 1341
The final part of the model requires allocation of the total number
of accidents to the various counties in the United States. A separate
allocation procedure was developed for cruise and on or near airport
accidents. For on!or near airport accidents it was assumed that the
probability that an accident takes place in any given county is propor-
tional to the number of general aviation operations in that county. For
the 905 airports which now have FAA control towers or are candidates for
control towers we obtained the number of operations for general aviation
as well as air taxi and commuter for the year 1977, and we obtained fore-
casts for the years 1978 through 1990. .2 We then used the forecast to
determine a growth rate to predict the operations at these airports in
1993. These airports in 1977 included an estimated 30%of all general
aviation operations and 100%of all air taxi and commuter operations.
The remainder of general aviation operations for 1993 was derived
from estimates of general aviation operations by state for 1987.3. Again
an annual growth rate was used to estimate state operations for 1993.
From the total operations of the 905 airports and the total state opera-
tions we determined for each state how many general aviation operations
will not originate or terminate at one of the 905 airports. These un-
allocated operations were allocated to the countries within the state
according to population. They were then added to the totals for the 905
airports by county to estimate the total operations by county.
While accidents that take place on or near an airport are generally
related to the number of operations at the airport, accident rates for
cruise accidents, on the other hand, might be more appropriately deter-
mined by the total number of miles or hours. An estimate of total hours
Terminal Area Forecast Fiscal Years 1970 to 1990, U.S. Department of
Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, 1978.
_ General Aviation Forecast 1975 to 1987 State, Regional and National
Operations, prepared for the U.S. DOTFAA Office of Aviation Policy,
Final Report, April, 1976.
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or miles by county is thus needed to allocate cruise accidents to the
various counties. Wewere not, however, able to obtain any data on
general aviation mileage wtihin each county. By the same type of proce-
dures noted above, we were able to obtain forecasts of local and itinerant
operations for each county in the country. The time per operation of
itinerant and local flights are 38 and II minutes, respectively. (Specif-
ically, for example, each itinerant operation takes on average 76 minutes
and consists on average of 5.4 operations.) We then assumed that the air
mileage of each itinerant and local operation is approximately the same
as all other operations of the same type, and that each operation takes
place completely within the one or two counties where the take offs and
landings occur. These assumptions are obviously not true. They are con-
servative, however, in the sense that aircraft mileage will be assigned
wholely to the originating and terminating counties where the density of
vulnerable facilities is generally greater than any other county of the
operations path. By making these assumptions the probability that a
given cruise accident takes place within a given county is proportional
to 38 times the number of itinerant operations plus eleven times the
number of local operations.
Thus, in summary the general aviation accident model is as follows:
I. There are 48 cruise accidents and 37 on or near airport
fire accidents per year (plus an additional estimated 2
and 1 for air taxi and commuter) or a total of 88.
2. For each cruise accident
38 Itin i + II Loc.Prob(County i) = 1
zi 38 Itin i + II Loci
where
Itin i = Estimated itinerant operations for county i
Loc i = Estimated local operations for county i
and for each on or near airport accident
Prob(county i) = Itini + Loci
slntin. + Loc.1 1
3. The conditional probabilities of phase and aircraft type, based
on Table B-14 and adjusted for growth rates, are as presented
in Table 3-I.
TABLE B-15
ACCIDENTS,FATALITIES, RATESU.S. GENERALAVIATION
1969-1978
Accident Rates
Per 100,000 Per Million
" Aircraftf Aircraft- Aircraft- Aircraft-
Accidents Hours Flown Hiles Flown Hours Flown Miles Flown
Year Total Fatal Fatalities (000) c/ (000) c/ Total Fatal Total Fatal
1969 4,767 647 1,495 b/ 25,351 3,926,461 18.8 2.55 1.21 0.164
1970 4,712 a/ 641 a/ 1,310 -- 26,030 3,207,127d__/ 18.1 2.46 1.47 0.200
1971 4,648-- 661 -- 1,355 25,512 3,143,181 18.2 2.59 1.48 0.211
1972 4,256 a/ 695 a/ 1,426 b/ 26,974 3,317,100 15.8 2.57 1.28 0,209
1973 4,255 a--/723 a--/ 1,412- 29,974 r/ 3,728,500 14.2 r/ 2.41 r/ 1.14 0.193
1974 4,425 a--/729 a--/ 1,438 31,413_/ 4,042,700 14.1 rZ/2.31 rZ/ 1.04 0.180
! 1975 4,237 a/ 675 a/ 1,345 32,024r/ 4,238,400 13.2r/ 2.10r 1.00 0.159
1976 4,193 a--/695 _/ 1,320 33,922 r--/ 4,476,014 12.3 _/ 2.04 _/ 0.94 0.155
1977 4,286 a--/702 a--/ 1,436 35,792 r--/ 4,786,400 12.0 r--/1.96 _/ 0.90 0.147
1978 P 4,609 795 1,690 b/ 36,600 4,519,900 12.6 2.17 1.02 0.176
a/ Suicide/sabotageaccidentsincludedin all computationsexcept rates (1970-I,1972-3,1973-2,
1974-2, 1975-2,1976-4,1977-1).
b/ Includesair carrierfatalities (1969-82,1972-5, 1978-142)when in collisionwith general aviation
aircraft.
c/ Source: FAA
d--/Beginningin 1970, the decrease in aircraft-milesflown is the result of a change in the FAA standard for
estimatingmiles flown.
r/ Revised
NATIONALTRANSPORTATIONSAFETY BOARD
Washington,D.C. 20594
January 3, 1979

APPENDIX C
EQUIPMENTDATA

Equipment
Facility Category - Number of Pieces $ Cost
Category Number Equipment E Factor Index ** Per Piece
Households 1 TV/Stereo 3,4E+09 5.0E+O0 04 80
White Goods
Furnace
Police 2 Motor Generator I.OE+06 I.OE+O0 Ol 98
3 Radio Trans. in
Veh. 2.0E+08 8,5E-04 03 250
4 Teletype Mach, 2.4E+08 1.9E-05 03 108
Misc. Eqpt.
5 Small Computer
Line Printer I.IE+09 I.IE-G5 03 4489
Small Computers
Large Computer
6 PBX (Small) 1.8E+09 2.2E-05 03 9800
7 CRTTerminals 2.4E+09 7.4E-05 03 113
!
-_ Radio Control
Console
Fi re 8 Motor Generator
(large) 1.5E+06 1. OE+O0 Ol 9
9 Motor Generator
(small) 1.5E+07 2.0E+O0 Ol 20
I0 PBX (small) 7.3E+07 I.OE+O0 Ol 1040
II Radio Trans,
in veh. 2.0E+08 3.1E-04 03 80
12 Radio Control
Console 5.0E+08 7.8E-06 03 80
13 Radio Trans-
ceivers 9,0E+08 4.7E-06 03 250
Post Office 14 Sorter with OCR 2.5E+08 2_2E-05" 03 800
Sorting Center Sorter w/o OCR
*Truncate
**Indices in Appendix D
Equi pment
Facility Category - Number of Pieces $ Cost
Category Number Equipment E Factor Index Per Piece
Subway 15 Aute. Fare Coll. 3.3E+07 1.0E-02 07 250
16 Radio 2.5E+08 O.5E+O0 07 80
17 Sch. Syst.-
S_l. Comp. 2.8E+08 5.0E-03 07 800
PBX (small)
R.R. Terminal 18 Mobile Trans. 3.9E+08 2,0E+OI 20 80
19 PBX (smal I) 5.4E+08 1.0E+O0 20 800
20 CRTTerminals 7.9E+09 1.8E+OI 20 137
Radio Control
Console
Transceivers
Genera i 21 Var. Freq. Cont. I.OE+09 I.OE-02 09 15,200
, Manufacturing* 22 Digital Speed
Control 2.0E+09 3.3E-03 09 1,700
23 Transf. Sub.
Switch 6.3E+09 2.7E-03 09 65,800
24 Fork Lift
Trucks 1.7E+07 3.3E-02 09 80
Battery Charger-
Truck
25 Programmable
Palletizer 1.7E+08 1.7E-03 09 250
26 Inj. i'lold
Heater Control s 3.3E+08 4.0E-02 09 80
27 Quality Control
Instr. 3.3E+09 3.3E-02 09 250
Computer Facility
(smal I ) 3.3E+09 2. OE+O0 08 800
PBX (small)
*Equipment categories 21-22 From SIC 2824; 23 from SIC 3714; 2-4-28 From
SIC 2844
Equipment
Facility Category - Number of Pieces $ Cost
Category Number Equipment _ Factor Index Per Piece
Hanufacturer 29 In process 13, 15
of Electronic spray paint 1.3E+07 5.9E-04 17, II 3,760
Equipment
30 In process 13, 15,
plaster parts 2.0E+07 5.9E-04 17, II 2,420
31 Master Oscillator 13, 15,
Controller 1.4E+08 2.4E-03 17, II 8,838
Incomping Insp.
Test Eqpt.
32 Assembly Line 13, 15,
Signal Inter. 2.5E+08 4.1E+O0 17, II 1.16
, In process
elect, c_Ip.
In process
burn-in
33 Inj. mold temp 13, 15,
& pressure 5.0E+08 1.2E-02 17, II 1,800
34 In process life 3.3E+09 5.9E-02 13, 15
test 17, II 2.50
Telephone Co. 35 Switching Center 1.4E+09 I.OE+O0 04 0.065
Equipment
Facility Category - Number of Pieces $ Cost
Category Number Equipment E Factor Index Per Piece
Radio/TV 36 Mobile Mini Cam 1.9E+07 3.0E+O0 22, 24 2,500
37 Studio Eqpt. 4.0E+08 4.0E+O0 22, 24 1,225
Transf. & Transm
Control Room
PBX (small)
General 38 Motor generator 27, 31
Merchandise (large) 1.8E+06 2.0E-03 33, 35 8
Retailers 39 PBX (small) 7.7E+08 I.OE+O0 26, 30
32, 34 800
40 POSTerminals 2.5E+09 2.0E-OI 27, 31
33, 35 250
41 HVACControls 7.7E+09 4.0E-03 27, 31| 33, 35 80
Retail
Grocers 42 POSTerminals I.OE+09 1.4E+OI 28 226
HVACControls
Finance & 36, 38
Insurance 43 PBX (small) 3.3E+09 I.OE+O0 40, 42 800
Computer
Services 44 PBX (small) 2.8E+08 I.OE+O0 44 800
45 Gen. Office
Eqpt. 2.8E+09 I.OE+O0 45 80
46 Computer (large) 2.9E+09 I.OE+O0 44 8,500
Electronic 47 PBX (small) 3.3E+09 I.OE+O0 46, 50 800
R&D, Univ. 48 Instruments 3.3E+09 I.OE+O0 47, 51 80
Hospitals 49 Generator (large) 5.0E+06 - l.OE+O0 48 800
50 Gen. Instr.
Patient Area 1.5E+08 l.SE-Ol 05 250
51 PBX 3.0E+09 l.OE+O0 48 800
52 X-Ray 6.0E+09 5.5E-03 05 800
Equipment
Facility Category - Number of Pieces $ Cost
Category Number Equipment E Factor Index Per Piece
Airports 53 TTY at Terminal 2.0E+09 4.1E-04 06 250
54 ASR 2.0E+09 * 2500
55 Computer at
Tower 3.1E+09 * 800
56 Consoles at
Tower 3.1E+09 4.7E-05 06 250
Auto & Truck
Assembly 57 Spray Paint
Drying Tunnel 5.7E+04 2.5E-04 19 12080
58 Spot Welder
Controls 3.3E+06 1.3E'02 19 1700
59 Prog. Auto.
Helders 9.8E+07 5.0E-04 19 12800
60 Assembly Line
' Controllers 9 8E+07 5.0E-04 19 1280J
61 Welder Controls I.OE+08 5.0E-04 19 1900
62 PBX (small) I.OE+09 I.OE+O0 18 800
63 Computer System
(large) I.OE+09 I.OE+O0 18 12800
*Set to 1 if category 06>I,000

APPENDIXD
DEMOGRAPHICDATA INDICES
Index DemographicData Cat_
I Dummy Variable= 1 Per County
2 Area
3 Population
4 Families
5 HospitalBeds
6 Air CarrierOperations
7 Number of Subway Cars
8-9 Facilities,EmployeesSIC Code 1900
lO-ll Facilities,EmployeesSIC Code 3573
12-13 Facilitie.s._EmployeesSIC Code 3650
14-15 Facilities,EmployeesSIC Code 3660 !
16-17 Facilities.,EmployeesSIC Code 3670
18-19 Facilities,EmployeesSIC Code 3710
20-21 Facilities,EmployeesSIC Code 4011
22-23 Facilities,EmployeesSIC Code 4830
24-25 Facilities,EmployeesSIC Code 4890
26-27 Facilities,EmployeesSIC Code 5310
28-29 Facilities,EmploveesSIC Code 5410
30-31 Facilities,Employees.SIC Code 5600
32-33 Facilities,Employees.SIC Code 5700
34-35 Facilities,EmployeesSIC Code 5900
36-37 Facilities,EmployeesSIC Code 6020
38-39 Facilities,EmployeesSIC Code 6100
40-41 Facilities,Employees.SIC Code 6200
42-43 Facilities,EmployeesSIC Code 6300
44-45 Facilities,EmployeesSIC Code 7370
46-47 Facilities,EmployeesSIC Code 7391
48-49 Facilities,EmployeesSIC Code 8060
50-51 Facilities,EmployeesSIC Code 8220
D-l

APPENDIXE
DETAILS ONVARIANCEOF DOLLARL'OSSPERACCIDENT
To determine the dollar loss statistics given an accident, it is necessary
to condition the calculation on the number of failures. Thus we have
the following conditional expectation formulae for the first and second
moments of dollar loss L given and accident. In the two summations,
the variable _, represents the number of failures and p(_) represents
the probability of _ failures.
EL = _,=Ip(_) E(LI_)
and
oo
EL2= _=l p(_')E(L21_')
and
VAR L : EL2 - E(L)2
where
E(xl_) represents the expected value of variable X given _ failures
Because expectations are additive, we have
E(L I_,) : ,_E(XoI _)
E-1
and
EL = _ "
_,=l _'P(_')E(XoI ')
= EX EN
0
where Xo represents the dollar loss per failure and N is the number
of failures per accident.
For the variance computation, by considering the individual scenario
probabilities, one can derive the following expression:
2
S i,kS Pi Qk ( _Var (Xo]i k)) + _2E (X ]i,k)EL2 : P(_) ' o
_=l
where now
k = Amount released
i = County
= Number of failures
E-2
Pi and Qk are the scenario probabilities(SeeAppendixA) and the
statisticsof Xo giveni andk are basedon the failureratesfor each
equipmentclassand scenario.An alternateexpressionfor EL2 can be
obtainedby consideringthe covarianceof two separatelossesgiven
failures. The expressionthatcan be derivedin thiscase is
EL2 = 2
_=l P(_) (_ Var (X 1_)+ _2 E(XoI_)_ _(_ _ I) cov)o
where
cov_= covarianceof two separatelossesgiven_ failures ,
The approximateexpressiongiven in Chapter5 (i.e.,expression5-1)
followsfrom the above if one assumesthat cov_ is zero and that the
distributionof (Xol_)in independentof _, the number of failures.
These assumptionsare importantonly if _ > I. Since the probability
of multiplefailures is very low, the approximateexpressionin Chapter
5 is virtuallyidenticalto the exact expressionfor Var L.
E-3
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